Millions of Apple AirPlay-enabled devices could be hijacked via Wi-Fi, according to researchers who uncovered a broad set of security flaws they’ve dubbed AirBorne. The findings illuminate how a collection of bugs in AirPlay, Apple’s local wireless protocol for streaming and screen-sharing, can enable attackers who are on the same network to move laterally from one infected device to others, potentially deploying malware, spying with microphone access, or building a botnet of compromised hardware. While Apple has released patches for Apple-branded devices and warned that some exploits require specific conditions, the researchers warn that hundreds of millions of third‑party devices still face a long road to patching — if they are patched at all.
AirPlay lets iPhones and MacBooks seamlessly play music, photos, and videos on other Apple devices or on compatible speakers, TVs, and receivers. The new AirBorne findings expose how that same wireless convenience can become a pathway for compromise, enabling a hacker to leverage a network foothold to propagate code across a heterogeneous ecosystem of devices. The implications extend beyond the home to corporate environments where employees’ own devices, conference-room gear, and smart displays share a single network. In short, what starts as a familiar, everyday feature could become an instrument for sustained, hard-to-detect intrusion if devices aren’t promptly updated.
What AirPlay and AirBorne are, and why they matter
AirPlay is Apple’s native, all‑in‑one solution for wireless streaming and display sharing across compatible devices. It works over a local Wi-Fi network, enabling guests and household members to push content to speakers, televisions, receivers, and other devices that implement the AirPlay protocol. AirPlay is designed to be open-ended in practice, allowing third-party hardware to integrate the functionality through Apple’s software development kit (SDK). That openness, however, creates a supply chain of software that spans numerous manufacturers, each responsible for patching vulnerabilities in their own hardware and firmware.
The AirBorne project refers to a set of vulnerabilities identified by the Tel-Aviv-based cybersecurity firm Oligo. The researchers described multiple bug classes tied to AirPlay’s SDK and to AirPlay’s own software that third-party devices rely upon. One key thread of the AirBorne findings involves flaws in the AirPlay SDK that could enable attackers on the same Wi-Fi network to hijack devices such as speakers, receivers, set-top boxes, and smart TVs. These devices, once compromised, could be controlled remotely, potentially allowing attackers to maintain a covert foothold on a network and use it to reach other targets.
Another facet of AirBorne concerns bugs that could affect AirPlay-enabled Apple devices themselves, including the possibility of exploitation tied to default AirPlay settings. In these cases, attackers would need to be on the same local network as the target device to exploit the flaw. The scope of impact is broad because AirPlay is embedded in a large family of consumer electronics and smart devices, extending beyond Apple’s own hardware.
Apple has acknowledged some of the AirBorne flaws and released patches for affected Apple devices over recent months. Yet, the landscape for third-party devices is more complicated. The core issue, as described by researchers, is that AirPlay is deployed by many manufacturers through an SDK that Apple does not directly patch or control. When third-party vendors fail to push timely updates, devices can remain vulnerable for years, or in some cases indefinitely. This reality underscores a tension that is central to modern consumer tech ecosystems: the patching cadence of major platforms versus the patching cadence of countless disparate devices that rely on the same underlying protocol.
Oligo’s chief technology officer, Gal Elbaz, emphasized the scale and persistence of the risk. He noted that the breadth of devices supporting AirPlay means a vast number of products could harbor vulnerabilities for extended periods. “Because AirPlay is supported in such a wide variety of devices, there are a lot that will take years to patch—or they will never be patched,” Elbaz said. “And it’s all because of vulnerabilities in one piece of software that affects everything.” This sentiment highlights a practical reality: the patch management problem is not limited to a single vendor or a single device; it spans an entire ecosystem.
Despite Oligo’s close collaboration with Apple to patch devices and validate fixes on Macs and other Apple offerings, the researchers warned that many third-party gadgets are likely to remain hackable unless users take action to update. The dynamic is simple but consequential: if a hacker can reach the same Wi-Fi network as a vulnerable device—whether by breaking into another system on a home or corporate network, or simply by joining the same coffee shop or airport network—they can exploit these flaws to wrest control of the device. From there, the intruder can use that control to stay undetected, pivot to neighboring devices, or enlist the compromised machines into a botnet.
The AirBorne story also draws attention to a broader class of risks: devices with microphones could be turned into covert listening devices for espionage. In the case of AirPlay-enabled devices, this capacity is particularly concerning because microphones are a common feature across speakers, TV adapters, and smart displays. The researchers did not publish a ready-made malware sample tailored to a specific target, but the vulnerability chain is clear enough to demonstrate a credible threat path.
Scope: how many devices could be affected
Oligo’s experts estimate that the number of potentially vulnerable third‑party AirPlay-enabled devices runs into the tens of millions. The size of this figure reflects how widely AirPlay has been adopted beyond Apple’s own hardware. The SDK is embedded in a broad array of consumer electronics that range from speakers and soundbars to set-top boxes and smart TVs. The large vendor ecosystem means that while Apple can push patches to its own devices quickly, many third-party manufacturers must release firmware updates, test them, and distribute them to consumers through various channels. This multi-layered patching process introduces a time lag, and in some cases a patch may never arrive if a manufacturer discontinues support for a device or goes out of business.
Elbaz underscored the practical implications of this patching inertia. “There are a lot of devices that will take years to patch—or they will never be patched,” he said. The sheer variety of devices that implement AirPlay, across multiple product categories and brands, creates a sprawling patch management challenge that is not easily solved by a single vendor or a single operating system. This reality is magnified by the fact that many devices do not receive regular firmware updates after purchase, and some devices stop receiving security updates altogether within a few years of launch. In the words of the researchers, the breadth of devices means there can be hundreds of millions of devices with unpatched vulnerabilities if users lag on updates.
AirPlay’s integration with CarPlay further expands the potential attack surface. AirPlay’s sibling system CarPlay operates in vehicles’ dashboards to connect in-dash displays with mobile devices. The AirBorne report noted that CarPlay shares a vulnerability surface similar to AirPlay’s, raising concerns about the potential for attackers to seize control of a car’s head unit. The difference, however, is that in car scenarios, exploiting such vulnerabilities would generally require pairing the attacker’s device with the car’s head unit via Bluetooth or a USB connection. This pairing requirement imposes a significant practical barrier to exploitation in vehicles, although it does not eliminate risk for environments where Bluetooth or USB pairing could be manipulated or where compromised devices could connect to the car’s system.
In short, the AirBorne findings reveal an ecosystem-wide risk that encompasses both home entertainment hardware and automotive interfaces. The scale is driven by how many devices implement AirPlay and how many manufacturers are responsible for delivering timely updates. The consequence is a long tail of devices that could remain vulnerable for years, altering how security professionals, consumers, and manufacturers think about device lifecycle management and risk exposure.
How AirBorne could play out in the real world: attack scenarios and capabilities
AirBorne’s vulnerabilities create a plausible scenario in which an attacker can begin with a foothold on a local network and gradually expand control across multiple devices. The typical sequence starts with an attacker who already has access to the same Wi-Fi network as the target AirPlay-enabled devices. In a home environment, that could be a compromised router, a compromised guest device, or an attacker who has exploited a neighboring network. In corporate settings, the attacker could leverage a compromised endpoint on the office network or a guest network to initiate the attack.
Once on the same network, the attacker could leverage flaws in AirPlay’s SDK to hijack devices such as wireless speakers, receivers, set-top boxes, and smart TVs. The immediate goal is to seize control, but the attacker could pursue several parallel objectives: install ransomware, deploy stealthy espionage software, or establish a persistent presence that allows later access to other networked targets. A critical concern is that compromised AirPlay devices could serve as hidden gateways into the broader network, enabling lateral movement to other hosts that might contain more sensitive data or critical infrastructure.
Another potential outcome is the manipulation or exploitation of microphone capabilities. If a vulnerable device includes a microphone, an attacker could potentially enable covert audio capture. This capability would be useful for surveillance or intelligence gathering, turning everyday electronics into tools for espionage. While the researchers did not produce a ready-made malware payload targeting a specific device, they provided demonstrations that illustrate how easily a compromised AirPlay device could be repurposed to extend an attacker’s reach within a network.
The AirBorne vulnerabilities also raise questions about the possibility of multi-device compromises. Once an attacker has control of one AirPlay-enabled gadget on a network, they might attempt to exploit other devices using the same network to propagate their foothold. This lateral movement is a core feature of cyber intrusions that seek to maximize impact while minimizing visible indicators of compromise. The result could be a stealthy, coordinated intrusion across numerous devices over time, with only occasional signs of unusual activity on a router, a speaker, or a TV.
In addition to the home environment, the AirBorne capabilities have implications for workplace networks where several devices share a single infrastructure. Conferences, offices, hotels, and other venues commonly host a mix of consumer electronics and enterprise equipment; this mix creates a fertile ground for attackers who aim to blend into legitimate network traffic while quietly expanding their control. The practical takeaway is that the risk is not limited to a single device family or a single network type. Instead, it spans a broad spectrum of environments where AirPlay-enabled devices operate side by side with other networked hardware.
Oligo’s researchers noted a contrast between AirPlay-focused vulnerabilities and the situation with CarPlay. While AirPlay vulnerabilities could be exploited on the same network relatively easily, CarPlay-based hacking would require more direct physical proximity to the vehicle’s head unit via Bluetooth or USB. This distinction is important because it means that CarPlay-related exploitation might be less accessible from a purely wireless attack while in a vehicle. Nevertheless, the possibility remains that a car already compromised in other ways could be exposed to attack through AirPlay-enabled components in the vehicle’s infotainment system.
CarPlay and vehicle risk: what changing environments mean for attackers
CarPlay is the automotive counterpart to AirPlay, designed to bring iPhone functionality to vehicles’ dashboards and entertainment systems. The AirBorne report highlights that CarPlay is affected by the same class of vulnerabilities that impact AirPlay. This finding expands the attack surface beyond home entertainment and into automotive ecosystems, of which there are more than 800 CarPlay-enabled car and truck models. The threat in the car domain, however, hinges on realistic exploitation routes. In the vehicle context, attackers would need to pair their own device with the car’s head unit via Bluetooth or a USB connection to exploit the vulnerability. This technical requirement significantly reduces the probability of remote exploitation while the vehicle is in motion or parked, compared to the more accessible scenario in a home network where devices across different rooms are on the same Wi-Fi.
Despite the higher barrier to entry in the car setting, the implication remains troubling: a compromised AirPlay-enabled audio or display system could intersect with a vehicle’s internal networks, potentially affecting the head unit, infotainment display, or other connected electronics. In practice, the car-based risk is more likely to manifest as a targeted attack against a vehicle’s digital ecosystem rather than a broad, opportunistic exploitation across many vehicles. Still, the vulnerability class remains meaningful because it underscores how a central protocol used widely in consumer electronics can become a vector for compromise in multiple contexts, including vehicles that increasingly rely on network-connected components for navigation, media, and telematics.
Oligo’s researchers emphasize that the car-related exposure is distinct from the home environment. The necessity of physical pairing reduces the likelihood of broad, automated exploitation in the wild, but it does not eliminate risk for scenarios where attackers can gain proximity to a vehicle or exploit a misconfigured head unit that accepts remote commands via Bluetooth or USB. These nuances matter for car manufacturers and security teams who must consider both wireless and wired attack surfaces when designing protective measures for in-car systems.
Response from Apple and the patching landscape for AirPlay
The AirBorne disclosures prompted a coordinated response from Apple and the broader device ecosystem. Oligo reports that it engaged with Apple for months to address the AirBorne bugs in affected devices, and Apple has released patches for some recent and widely used Apple products. Apple’s official posture emphasizes that the most practical exploits require an attacker to be on the same Wi-Fi network as the target device, which, in itself, constitutes a meaningful restriction. Apple also notes that, while some user data may reside on devices like televisions and speakers, the amount of data at risk is typically limited.
In discussing patch management, Apple highlighted that patches have been and continue to be released for affected Apple devices. The company also pointed out that certain attack vectors were contingent on specific default settings or configurations, which could be leveraged only under particular conditions. This nuance matters because it implies that simply having patched firmware is not enough; users must ensure that their devices’ configurations align with secure defaults and that those defaults are maintained across updates.
For many third-party devices, patching remains a persistent challenge. Although Apple has implemented patches for its own products, the life cycle of many third-party devices means that manufacturers must create, test, and distribute firmware updates that incorporate AirPlay-related fixes. This process can be lengthy, often requiring approval from brand stakeholders, certification processes, and distribution through multiple channels. The result is a patch deployment bottleneck that may leave millions of devices vulnerable for extended periods, especially in environments where devices are not regularly updated or where vendors discontinue support.
Oligo’s collaboration with Apple also involved joint testing and validation of fixes. The researchers reported that the fixes addressed the previously identified vulnerabilities, at least for the Apple ecosystem. However, the broader reality remains that third-party devices depend on manufacturers to supply updates, and those updates may not reach all devices promptly. Apple’s emphasis on the limited data exposure in some scenarios signals that the direct impact on user privacy can vary depending on the device and its capabilities, but the risk of unauthorized access to device control remains a significant concern.
The larger takeaway from Apple’s and Oligo’s actions is that upstream fixes can reduce risk, but downstream patch adoption is critical for true risk reduction. Consumers who own AirPlay-enabled devices should stay vigilant about updates, look for firmware announcements from device manufacturers, and apply patches promptly when they become available. The ecosystem-wide nature of AirPlay means that even a single unpatched device can serve as a weak link, enabling an attacker to traverse a network and impact other devices over time.
The broader security implications: patch management, trust, and the Apple ecosystem
The AirBorne disclosures highlight a broader problem in security for widely deployed protocols that span many manufacturers. When a major technology provider relies on a network of third-party vendors to implement and patch vulnerabilities, the patching process becomes a distributed, multi-stakeholder endeavor. This reality raises questions about patch cadence, accountability, and the longevity of security guarantees across consumer devices.
Patrick Wardle, CEO of the Apple-focused security firm DoubleYou, notes that third-party integration of Apple technologies via an SDK shifts responsibility away from Apple’s direct control. In Wardle’s view, this model creates a potential erosion of trust if vendors fail to update their products promptly, or if product lifecycles outlast vendor support. He explains that once hardware leaves direct Apple control, the patching process relies on the vendor’s capacity and willingness to push updates. The risk is not only user-facing inconvenience but a broader credibility issue for the Apple ecosystem if a large portion of AirPlay-enabled devices remain unpatched for extended periods.
The AirBorne case also underscores a risk common to many modern software ecosystems: the possibility that devices with outdated firmware continue to harbor vulnerabilities simply because they are not actively maintained by manufacturers. This dynamic is particularly relevant for smart home devices, where firmware updates may be irregular, and consumers may be slow to apply updates or to replace aging hardware. The resulting patch gap can translate into real-world security exposures, even for devices that are not high-value targets themselves but can serve as stepping stones to more sensitive targets.
The conversation surrounding AirBorne also touches on user behavior and security culture. Uri Katz, an Oligo researcher, emphasizes the practical question many people face: when was the last time you updated your speaker? His point is not merely about knowing that a patch exists but about recognizing the everyday habits that determine security outcomes. The question invites deeper reflection about how buyers, retailers, and IT teams manage firmware updates, monitor for new advisories, and implement network-wide protections such as segmentation, monitoring, and prompt patching.
Institutional risk management implications flow from these observations. Enterprise IT departments may need to rethink network architecture to limit cross-device communication between consumer devices and critical business assets. This could include applying network segmentation, implementing stricter access controls for guest devices, and deploying security monitoring that can identify unusual lateral movement within a local network. The AirBorne case provides a concrete incentive for organizations to reevaluate their approach to IoT and consumer device security, especially in spaces where people bring personal devices onto corporate networks.
How Oligo and Apple are addressing the patchwork of devices
Oligo’s researchers worked closely with Apple in testing and validating the fixes that Apple rolled out for its devices. The collaboration underscores a model of disclosure and joint remediation, in which researchers share technical details with a vendor to facilitate rapid, effective patching. Apple has publicly stated that patches have been created for impacted Apple devices and that certain limitations apply to the exploitation scenarios, predominantly due to the need for the attacker to be on the same Wi-Fi network as the target device.
For third-party devices, Apple’s public messaging indicates a more complex patch picture. While the company has issued patches for its own hardware, it has also noted that there are limitations on the exploits that could operate under the AirPlay vulnerabilities. The practical reality, as described by the researchers and Apple, is that the threat surface remains significant for devices that are still waiting for updates, or for devices that can’t be patched easily due to hardware constraints or discontinued support.
In the wake of AirBorne, some manufacturers are accelerating their firmware updates and security testing to ensure that AirPlay-enabled devices in their ecosystems are protected. This includes verifying that devices that rely on the AirPlay SDK are patched against the known vulnerabilities and that any default configuration weaknesses are addressed. The patching process is ongoing, and Apple’s emphasis on providing patches for affected devices is part of a broader, multi-vendor effort to restore trust and reduce risk across the AirPlay ecosystem.
Security researchers have also stressed the importance of consumer awareness. Even when patches are available, users must actively apply firmware updates to their devices. Manufacturers can release updates, but the effectiveness of those updates hinges on consumer adoption. The AirBorne case highlights how a vulnerability can persist if users ignore patch notices or if devices do not automatically update. In response, many manufacturers are improving their update mechanisms, offering easier patch installation experiences, and communicating more clearly about the security implications of AirPlay-related bugs.
Lessons for manufacturers, vendors, and consumers
The AirBorne disclosures carry several practical lessons for the broader tech industry. First, when a protocol like AirPlay becomes a backbone for a wide array of devices, patch management cannot be centralized to a single vendor. Instead, the ecosystem requires coordinated, ongoing updates from multiple manufacturers. The timing and quality of these patches determine how quickly risk is reduced for consumers and organizations alike. The industry must align on clearer vulnerability disclosure timelines, standardized patching practices, and rapid validation processes to ensure uniform protection across heterogeneous devices.
Second, the case underscores the importance of secure defaults and defense-in-depth. Even if a vulnerability exists in the underlying SDK or protocol, secure default configurations can mitigate exposure. If devices are configured to minimize exposure on the network or to restrict AirPlay access to trusted devices, attackers would face additional barriers to exploitation. The research highlights that default settings and user choices can significantly influence real-world risk.
Third, the AirBorne findings illuminate a critical patching gap in consumer electronics that rely on external SDKs. When control over the patching cycle shifts to third-party vendors, the patch cadence becomes a bottleneck. This scenario argues for stronger contractually mandated patch obligations in vendor agreements, better end-user communication about security updates, and easier mechanisms for users to apply updates across all AirPlay-enabled devices. It also points to a potential market shift: devices that offer longer-term security assurances and easier update pathways may win consumer trust.
Finally, the risk landscape created by AirBorne emphasizes the need for robust network security practices in homes and offices. Enterprises and households alike should consider network segmentation, device inventory management, and detection capabilities that can identify unusual traffic or unexpected activity on AirPlay-enabled devices. By implementing a proactive security posture, organizations can reduce the likelihood that an initial breach on one device becomes a network-wide compromise.
What consumers can do now to reduce risk
- Keep AirPlay-enabled devices updated: Check for firmware or software updates from device manufacturers and apply patches promptly when available. Updates often include security fixes that address known vulnerabilities highlighted by researchers.
- Review AirPlay settings: Where possible, disable or restrict AirPlay access to trusted devices, and understand the default configurations that might make exploitation easier. Adjust settings to minimize exposure, especially on shared networks.
- Use network segmentation: Separate IoT and consumer electronics from critical business devices and sensitive data. A segmented network can help limit the spread of any potential compromise.
- Monitor for unusual activity: Keep an eye out for unexpected device behavior, such as a speaker responding to unfamiliar commands, or a TV that seems to receive streams from unrecognized sources. Security monitoring tools can help detect anomalous activity on local networks.
- Maintain device inventories: Maintain a list of AirPlay-enabled devices on your network and verify that each item has current firmware. This helps ensure that patches reach all vulnerable devices and prevents silent risk from older hardware.
- Favor devices with strong update support: When purchasing new gear, consider devices with proven, reliable update programs and clear security commitments. This reduces the likelihood of long patch gaps.
The AirBorne disclosures remind us that the convenience of wireless streaming can coexist with substantial security challenges. The path forward involves a combination of timely patches, better patch management across the entire ecosystem, more robust default security settings, and informed consumer practices. By taking these steps, both individuals and organizations can reduce exposure to these vulnerabilities while continuing to enjoy the benefits of AirPlay and CarPlay in everyday life.
Conclusion
AirBorne reveals a systemic vulnerability in a cornerstone of modern wireless streaming: AirPlay and, by extension, CarPlay. The vulnerabilities exposed by Oligo show that a vast ecosystem of devices—ranging from home speakers to TVs to automotive head units—can become a networked attack surface if patches lag or never arrive. While Apple has taken important steps by releasing patches for its own devices and by collaborating with researchers, the patching burden remains heavy for tens of millions of third-party devices whose manufacturers vary in patch cadence and capability.
The practical takeaway is clear: security in an interconnected world requires coordinated, multi-layered defenses. Device makers must streamline patch development and delivery, and users must stay vigilant about updates and configurations. Enterprises should consider network segmentation and enhanced monitoring to prevent lateral movement that begins with a compromised AirPlay-enabled device. As the ecosystem evolves, the lessons from AirBorne emphasize the need for ongoing vigilance, stronger patching commitments from all vendors, and a recommitment to secure defaults that can help prevent simple, opportunistic intrusions from becoming pervasive, long-lasting compromises. In the meantime, AirPlay’s promise of seamless wireless experiences remains valuable, but it must be matched with disciplined security practices to protect the devices and networks users rely on every day.
