In the final weeks of his two-year tour leading Mission Delta 2, Col. Raj Agrawal sits at the intersection of traditional orbital cataloging and a rapidly evolving doctrine about adversaries’ intent in space. The unit he commanded at Peterson Space Force Base, Colorado, is responsible for tracking roughly 50,000 human-made objects whizzing through a theater that is increasingly crowded and increasingly contested. The work has evolved from simply knowing where objects sit to shaping how the United States will respond when their behavior hints at potential threats or national-security risks. The Space Force has framed these changes as part of a broader shift toward space domain awareness and the emergence of space warfare as a future, if not present, reality. Against this backdrop, Agrawal’s leadership offers a window into how the service is attempting to fuse traditional orbital surveillance with predictive intelligence, all while juggling cooperation with commercial space actors and international partners. This introductory overview sets the stage for a deeper exploration of Delta 2’s missions, the transformation of space operations, and the implications for national security in a domain where the line between curiosity, commerce, and combat is increasingly blurred.
Mission Delta 2 and the orbital catalog: data fusion, operational picture, and mission reach
Mission Delta 2 operates as a pivotal node in the United States military’s approach to space traffic management and space-domain operations. The unit aggregates data from a sprawling network of sensors, including radars and telescopes on the ground and in space, to identify, characterize, and exploit opportunities while mitigating vulnerabilities in orbit. This fusion process is not merely about cataloging where satellites sit; it is about transforming raw measurements into a coherent, combat-ready common operational picture that commanders can rely on for decision-making under pressure. The scope of the Delta 2 mission extends beyond passive tracking; it encompasses the analysis of intelligence information and the mapping of geocentric space terrain. The objective is to deliver timely, actionable insights that enable military forces to anticipate threats, optimize maneuvers, and protect critical assets in space. In practical terms, Delta 2 operates at the intersection of surveillance, assessment, and warning, ensuring that the United States can respond when space becomes a theater of operations rather than a passive domain for observation.
The unit’s daily operations reflect the complexity and scale of modern space activity. The Space Force notes that the catalog—an expansive ledger of objects orbiting Earth—remains a shared resource across military, intelligence, commercial, and even public spheres, with data distributed freely where appropriate. The catalog’s growth over the past two decades has been dramatic. In the period following 2007, when China’s anti-satellite missile test created thousands of new debris fragments, trackable objects surged from a relatively modest number to tens of thousands, complicating the job of keeping a clean, accurate map of what remains in orbit. Today, with the proliferation of launches and the increasing volume of satellites in low Earth orbit and beyond, the catalog numbers roughly 48,000 objects, a testament to the scale of modern space activity and the challenge of maintaining situational awareness amid rapid change. Delta 2’s responsibilities include not only maintaining this catalog but also integrating it with broader organizational efforts across Space Operations Command to ensure consistency of understanding across services, agencies, and allied partners.
The operational posture of Mission Delta 2 reflects a broader reorganization of how space domain information is produced and used. As a Space Defense unit, Delta 2 is aligned with a system of deltas that correspond to major functional goals—ranging from sensor integration to intelligence analysis to cyber defense and software sustainment. In practice, this means Delta 2 does not operate in isolation; it coordinates with other deltas and with external organizations to deliver a unified view of space activity. The buffer between space and battle space is thin, and Delta 2’s work is designed to minimize gaps in understanding that could lead to misinterpretations or miscalculations during a crisis. The unit’s command-and-control infrastructure is built to support rapid assessment and the rapid dissemination of warnings to both military and civilian operators when a conjunction risk emerges. In conjunction with private sector partners and international allies, Delta 2 is working toward a space domain where risk can be anticipated and mitigated with speed and precision rather than addressed after the fact.
A central feature of Delta 2’s approach is the proactive identification of “red” or high-interest objects. The commander characterizes a subset of trackable objects—roughly two thousand to two thousand two hundred—as part of a “red order of battle.” These are items the intelligence teams believe could behave in unpredictable or potentially harmful ways that diverge from simple orbital mechanics. The goal is to maintain a focus not only on where these objects are now but also on how they might evolve in ways that could threaten space assets or operations. The red order of battle is an early-warning concept that informs resource allocation, sensor focus, and the development of defensive or mitigating strategies. The emphasis is on anticipation—on predicting how a given object might act in the near term and what contingencies would be required to preserve space safety and national security. The practical implications of this approach are significant: it shapes how the United States, its allies, and commercial operators prepare for possible contingency scenarios, from maneuvering to avoid collisions to developing responses to potential kinetic or non-kinetic threats.
The scale of the operations and the tempo of activity are matched by a commitment to continuous improvement. The United States has aimed to raise the capacity of its tracking networks to identify objects as small as a golf ball, a measure of the precision and resilience required to keep space safe in a crowded belt of orbital traffic. Yet the pace of activity remains a concern: the space environment is dynamic, with launches, maneuvers, and debris events capable of altering risk calculations in a matter of hours or days. Delta 2’s work is inseparable from broader questions about how to manage this environment in a way that safeguards critical military capabilities, supports commercial space endeavors, and maintains public access to space-based services. The overall objective is twofold: to deliver an accurate, timely depiction of what is in space, and to ensure that this depiction is translatable into effective action, whether through warnings, policy coordination, or operational planning.
In terms of resource management and process optimization, Mission Delta 2 has focused on improving the “common operational picture” used by military planners. The integration of diverse data streams—radar tracking, telescope observations, and intelligence assessments—requires robust data fusion techniques, standardized formats, and interoperable interfaces with other military and civilian agencies. The ultimate aim is to reduce latency between observation and response, ensuring that when a possible threat is identified, the appropriate decision-makers receive the necessary information to act in time. The challenges are not only technical but also geopolitical: the United States must balance the need for openness and collaboration with commercial partners and foreign actors with the imperative to maintain security, protect critical spaces, and prevent escalation in a domain where misinterpretation can have far-reaching consequences. Against this backdrop, Delta 2’s activities illustrate how modern space operations are simultaneously scientific, strategic, and cooperative in nature, requiring disciplined management of both data and doctrine to achieve lasting security outcomes.
From teacher to commander: Agrawal’s journey and the human story behind a high-stakes role
Col. Raj Agrawal’s professional arc is as telling as the policy shifts he now helps implement. Before donning the uniform of a Space Force officer, he spent eight years in Texas teaching music and mathematics at a challenging inner-city vocational high school. Trimble Technical High School in Fort Worth was not only a place of instruction but also a community hub where students faced family and economic hardships. Agrawal describes his experience there as formative: he was in frequent contact with students and families who were navigating difficult circumstances, often sharing in their daily routines and struggles. He taught not only academics but also music, and his involvement extended beyond the classroom, with a personal commitment that included attending church with families and sometimes helping students by giving them rides to and from school. He recounts that many of his former students eventually went on to lives that were meaningful and fulfilling, a memory that he carries as a source of motivation and purpose in his later, more technical work.
The turn from education to national service came when Agrawal felt drawn to higher duties and public service in the Air Force. He initially auditioned for and joined the Air Force Band, thanks to his musical background, but a counselor encouraged him to apply to Officer Candidate School. He accepted the invitation and began a path that diverged from his early aspirations yet proved equally meaningful. His early Air Force career placed him in the ICBM field, but the course of events after the September 11 attacks shifted his trajectory away from that track. He explains that 9/11 created barriers for people with his surname or background, delaying security clearances and complicating career development in the ICBM community. Ultimately, the Air Force assigned him to space operations, a pivot that would define the remainder of his professional life.
Agrawal quickly established himself as a capable leader and educator within the Space Force ecosystem. He became an instructor in space situational awareness, a role that aligned with his broader interest in education and training. His career also took him to the National Reconnaissance Office and, later, to the Pentagon in 2019, during a pivotal period as the Defense Department prepared to organize Space Force as a distinct military service. He led a team of about 100 people tasked with drafting the first Space Force budget, a responsibility that underscored his capability to blend analytical rigor with strategic foresight. His appointment to Peterson Space Force Base to command Mission Delta 2 represented a culmination of years of experience across different domains—education, intelligence, space operations, and budget formulation.
Agrawal’s personal reflection on his calling emphasizes the central role of teaching and mentoring in his approach to leadership. He frames teaching as the core of his professional ethos, a thread that connects his earlier work with his current responsibilities. He speaks openly about his early career in education, describing how his experiences teaching in an urban environment shaped his worldview and reinforced the importance of service, accountability, and community impact. This background informs his approach to leadership in a high-stakes, complex domain where clear communication, patient mentorship, and the cultivation of capable professionals are critical to sustaining what is a modern and evolving Space Force. The narrative of his journey—teacher turned space operations commander—offers a human-centric lens on the broader transformations that space policy and operations have undergone in recent years.
The arc from a classroom to a command center also reflects the broader reimagining of careers within the Space Force. Agrawal’s transition illustrates how a workforce with diverse skill sets—education, scientific training, intelligence analysis, and military planning—can converge on a common mission: to secure a safe, predictable, and sustainable space environment for national security and economic stability. His experiences in education likely contributed to how he communicates complex concepts to a broad audience, both inside and outside the military. This capacity for pedagogy, coupled with a deep technical understanding of space operations, positions leaders like Agrawal to guide the service through a period of rapid change and expanding challenges. The personal story of his life—educator, Air Force officer, space operations expert—embodies the broader narrative of a service continually redefining its identity in the face of a crowded, contested, and ever-more strategic orbital domain.
The transformation of space operations: from Space Situational Awareness to Space Domain Awareness
The evolution from Space Situational Awareness to Space Domain Awareness marks a central shift in how the Space Force frames its mission and how it communicates with partners and adversaries. The terminology isn’t merely cosmetic; it reflects a deepening understanding of space as a contested domain with purposeful actors pursuing strategic objectives. In this view, Space Situational Awareness describes the raw knowledge produced by sensors about objects in space—the positions, velocities, and trajectories that can be cataloged and analyzed. While SSA has long been accessible to academia, industry, and international partners, Space Domain Awareness is a mission-focused concept designed to translate sensor data into outcomes that advance military objectives. SDA emphasizes the operational consequences of space activity, including how a domain-wide perspective can shape decisions about deterrence, risk management, and warfighting. The distinction is meaningful because it reframes the purpose of knowledge: not just to observe, but to enable actions that preserve space superiority and protect critical national-security interests.
The Space Force’s leadership, including Gen. John “Jay” Raymond, played a formative role in coining and refining the concept of Space Domain Awareness. The idea was to move beyond a passive catalog of satellites toward a domain-aware approach in which space activities are interpreted through the lens of operational effects, potential conflicts, and the need for resilience. In practical terms, the transition to SDA encompasses reorganizing how units like Mission Delta 2 operate. The 18th Space Defense Squadron, which once stood as a central hub for SDA activities, began to share responsibilities more broadly, allowing other units to specialize in cyber defense, software sustainment, intelligence analysis, and other critical undertakings. The effect of this reorganization is a more flexible and responsive command structure in which capabilities can be reallocated quickly to address emerging threats or opportunities. The overarching aim is to create a space domain that is not merely observed but actively prepared for and shaped by the joint force, the commercial sector, and international partners.
Agrawal explains that the shift from SSA to SDA is also a shift in emphasis toward the isomorphic translation of data into decisions. The newer model treats state vectors, predictive modeling, and anticipatory analysis as essential tools for understanding how space objects will behave in the future, not just where they are now. This shift has practical implications for how Delta 2, and the Space Force more broadly, manages resources and responds to risk. The integration of analytics with intelligence enables the organization to consider not only whether an object is in a collision path but also the likelihood and impact of a potential threat. The result is an enhanced ability to forecast, plan, and execute protective actions that minimize risk to critical space-based services and to allied space assets. This approach also helps explain why the Space Force emphasizes collaboration with commercial operators, as the data-driven insights are most valuable when shared with those who will be affected by them in real time. SDA thus becomes a practical framework for coordinating defense, diplomacy, and industry in pursuit of a stable, accessible, and secure orbital environment.
Under the SDA paradigm, the role of information sharing changes as well. Agrawal notes a deliberate move toward coordinating more closely with civil and commercial operators, with an eye toward offloading some responsibilities for safety and safety planning to other sectors where possible. One concrete aspect of this shift is the aim to have the Office of Space Commerce oversee civil or commercial collision notifications, freeing military resources to address national-security objectives. In this sense, SDA also embodies a doctrine of partnership: a recognition that space is increasingly a shared space where commercial and civil actors contribute to, and rely on, a common safety framework. The result is a more integrated, multi-actor ecosystem in which data about space objects and their predicted trajectories is treated as a shared asset, enabling more coordinated and timely actions across sectors and borders. The transformation from SSA to SDA encompasses not only terminology but a broader set of practices, including how missions are designed, how information is disseminated, and how decisions are made under the pressure of a rapidly changing orbital landscape.
A recurring theme in the SDA conversation is the reality that space cannot be directly observed in the same way as air, sea, or land environments. Space provides a unique set of challenges: we cannot physically view the space domain as we might see a battlefield, and the verification of object locations relies on a combination of radars, telescopes, and computational inferences. The continuity of this process depends on a robust, adaptive network of sensors, algorithmic interpretation, and human judgment. Agrawal emphasizes that SDA requires a credible, dynamic interpretation of what the sensors reveal—an interpretation that must be consistently aligned with the broader joint force’s objectives and the strategic guidance provided by policymakers. This alignment is essential to ensuring that the data generated by a sprawling array of sensors translates into timely, decisive actions that protect space assets and prevent escalation in a domain where even minor miscalculations can have outsized consequences. The shift to SDA thus represents a maturation of space operations—one that integrates science, policy, and strategy into a coherent approach designed to deter aggression while sustaining the space-based capabilities that modern life relies upon.
The “red” objects, intent, and the ethics of calling behavior in space
A central concept in Agrawal’s leadership is the so-called red order of battle—an implicit roster of high-interest objects that are believed to be capable of actions beyond simple, predictable orbital motion. The two-thousand-odd objects in this category are regarded by the intel and operations teams as potential sources of risk that could reflect unpredictable or unplanned behaviors, potentially tied to national security interests. The purpose of this designation is not to demonize or prematurely label assets, but to acknowledge that certain objects may demonstrate capabilities or behaviors that require heightened vigilance and readiness. This approach recognizes the complexity of space as an arena in which many actors, including other nations, commercial entities, and non-state actors, might pursue objectives in ways that a pure trajectory analysis cannot capture. The red objects thus become triggers for more thorough analysis, more extensive monitoring, and more robust planning to ensure that potential hazards are detected early and managed effectively.
To illustrate how this works in practice, Agrawal cites specific examples that have drawn the attention of the Space Force. Two satellites named Shijian-20 and Shijian-24C are highlighted as exemplars of the category’s concerns. Shijian-20 is described as a “tech demo” satellite that has evaded inspection by U.S. satellites, raising questions about its true intent despite being framed publicly as a scientific mission. Shijian-24C, in another instance, is described as having demonstrated capabilities that resemble dogfighting in space, a characterization that signals a capacity to maneuver aggressively in a way that could endanger other assets. These cases illustrate the kind of behavior that tests the boundaries of customary norms and raises important questions about how to classify and respond to potential aggressions in space. The Space Force positions its approach as nuanced and cautious: while there is a need to differentiate hostile actions from non-hostile or ambiguous maneuvers, there is also a willingness to escalate when behavior becomes uncoordinated, unplanned, and potentially harmful.
One key difficulty in distinguishing hostile acts in space stems from the absence of a conventional, visible battlefield. In other domains, the characterization of an act as hostile or escalatory is often grounded in observable actions and agreed-upon norms or treaties. In space, a lot of the data is indirect, and the interpretation depends on context, intent, and the broader pattern of behavior of the actors involved. Space Command is charged with applying a legal and policy framework to determine when a given action should be treated as a hostile act or a national-security concern. This process requires not only technical analysis but also strategic judgment about what constitutes an escalatory step in space and how to respond in a way that preserves both the safety of orbital operations and the possibility of future cooperation. The idea behind this careful, calibrated approach is to avoid unnecessary confrontation while ensuring that the United States and its allies can defend their interests and maintain the resilience of space-based services.
A crucial dimension of red-object analysis is the relationship with international norms and the international community. The Space Force does not act in a vacuum; it tracks how national policies, treaty expectations, and international dialogue shape what is permissible in space. Agrawal emphasizes that a critical predictor of hazardous behavior by space actors is the absence of coordination with the international community around large-scale launches or megaconstellations. When nations undertake significant deployments or testing without transparent notification or collaboration, the risk of misinterpretation and escalation increases dramatically. In contrast, when states coordinate with international partners on launches, maneuvers, and constellation management, the space domain can be treated more predictably and safely. The aim, in other words, is to encourage a culture of transparency and shared responsibility among spacefaring nations. The red-object framework, then, is not a punitive labeling system; it is a proactive tool for risk assessment, cognitive framing, and operational planning that seeks to prevent conflict and preserve space as a reliable global commons.
The red objects concept also interacts with the broader ecosystem of space activity, including commercial operators such as Starlink and Kuiper. The Space Force’s engagement with private sector actors is a crucial element of how risk is managed in practice. Agrawal notes that cooperation with Starlink has been constructive, with Starlink’s operators actively coordinating flight plans and decision-making processes to minimize risk. The collaboration serves as a model for how public and private actors can work together to maintain an orderly, safe, and accessible space environment. The Office of Space Commerce has a growing role in formalizing these arrangements, helping to formalize safety protocols, coordinate between national agencies, and streamline the exchange of data that enhances predictive capabilities. The trend toward closer public-private collaboration is driven by the realities of a space economy that depends on hundreds of commercial satellites and a wide array of space-based services. The red-object framework, therefore, not only drives defensive posture but also informs how the alliance of government and industry can sustain space operations in a way that benefits civilian life as well as national security.
The ethical and strategic questions raised by red objects also touch on how to communicate risk without destabilizing deterrence. The analysis must balance the need for caution with the imperative to avoid implications that could provoke unfounded suspicion or misinterpretation. The Space Force’s approach is to frame risk in precise, measurable terms, emphasizing what could happen and what would be required to respond. The object-focused mindset is complemented by a broader mission to understand intent—whether an object is pursuing a civilian objective, a military objective, or something more ambiguous. While the policy framework provides guardrails for what constitutes a hostile act, the practical, day-to-day work of Delta 2 involves interpreting a complex dataset to guide actions that maximize safety and minimize conflict potential. In sum, the red-order-of-battle concept embodies a proactive, risk-aware approach to space operations that recognizes both the value and the limits of what can be known about a given object’s intent.
Space commerce, cooperation, and the changing landscape of collision warnings
A defining feature of Mission Delta 2’s work is its increasing integration with civilian and commercial space activity. The Space Force is pursuing an organizational model in which safety and collision information can be shared across sectors without compromising the primary objective of national security. A long-standing aspiration is to place a portion of space-domain safety obligations under civilian oversight, gradually shifting those responsibilities away from front-line military operators. The Office of Space Commerce has a growing role in coordinating spaceflight safety, coordinating with Delta 2 to align on notification standards, and enabling commercial players to adjust their operations in ways that reduce overall risk. This shift reflects a pragmatic recognition that the space environment cannot be managed by a single class of actors alone; instead, it requires an ecosystem approach in which government and industry contribute to a shared safety framework.
The practical benefits of this approach are significant. The United States issues a vast number of conjunction-notification notices—up to one million per day—and in some periods, as many as 600,000 notifications are issued. In the prior year, Delta 2 distributed roughly 263 million conjunction notifications. The numbers underscore the scale of orbital operations and the necessity of an efficient, reliable notification system to prevent collisions. The system is designed to be interoperable with international partners and commercial operators alike, enabling a broad, collaborative approach to managing risk. The ultimate objective is to ensure that collision warnings and related safety information can be provided to satellite operators, not only within the United States but across allied nations, with a focus on fostering responsible, coordinated responses. The transition toward civil stewardship of some collision-notification tasks is intended to free military resources for purposes that more directly relate to national security and defense objectives, thereby optimizing the allocation of scarce capabilities across the entire space-domain enterprise.
Another facet of the space-commerce-cooperation model is the growing use of autonomous, self-monitoring safety measures by commercial launchers and satellite operators. Agrawal notes that modern launches increasingly carry onboard systems capable of monitoring safety metrics and autonomously aborting or adjusting trajectories if a threat to the public or to other satellites is detected. This shift reduces the burden on traditional military safety oversight and exemplifies how technology is enabling more resilient, self-reliant risk management in space. It also raises questions about how best to share data and coordinate responses in real time when a fault is detected or when adjustments are necessary to avoid a collision. The evolving landscape suggests a future in which private actors assume greater responsibility for the safe conduct of space activities, with the government serving as a regulator, partner, and guardian of a shared space environment.
The collaboration with private actors is not limited to Starlink and Kuiper. Agrawal notes that all U.S. and allied commercial entities have, so far, demonstrated strong cooperation with Mission Delta 2, participating in pre-launch planning, sharing relevant orbital data, and adjusting operational plans in ways that reduce risk. The Office of Space Commerce has increasingly become a focal point for these discussions, bridging gaps between government policy and industry practice. This partnership is essential to ensuring that space remains accessible, profitable, and safe for a broad range of activities—from communications and navigation to Earth observation and beyond. The overarching narrative is one of evolving governance in space: a layered system in which public institutions set the rules, private actors implement them on the ground and in orbit, and international partners participate in a shared framework of norms and standards. The result is a space environment that is more coordinated, more predictable, and better prepared to handle the complexities of a crowded orbital ecosystem.
The human and geopolitical dimensions of space debris, notices, and transparency
The conversation with Agrawal also highlights a critical dynamic of modern space operations: the obligation to share information about potential hazards with international partners, even when those partners are competitors or adversaries. A key point is that the United States has developed a practice of sending spaceflight-safety notices to China and Russia with the aim of reducing risk and encouraging more predictable behavior in space. The process is formal and operates within an oversight framework that includes the State Department and US Space Command. The goal is not to weaponize information or to escalate tensions but to promote a safer, more stable orbital regime. The State Department plays a crucial role in guiding how these notices are delivered and how responses—or non-responses—are interpreted. The practical reality is that not all responses are immediate or meaningful, but the act of sharing information is seen as a constructive signal of intent to preserve the safety of space operations for all.
China’s responses to these safety notices are mixed. Agrawal notes that there have been only a few instances in which China has explicitly engaged in a technical exchange regarding spaceflight safety. Most notices have been acknowledged passively, with occasional instances of more substantive engagement. The inconsistent engagement reflects broader geopolitical dynamics as well as the technical complexities of spaceflight safety and cooperation. The United States hopes for more sustained, fruitful technical exchanges that could help to reduce risk and increase transparency. The potential benefits of such exchanges are not purely tactical; they could lay the groundwork for longer-term confidence-building measures that allow two major spacefaring powers to operate with fewer surprises and greater predictability. This is particularly important in low Earth orbit, where debris and close approaches can occur with alarming frequency, and where a lack of timely information can increase the risk of unintended conflict.
The frequency and distribution of debris-related notices are an important indicator of the space environment’s fragility. Debris clouds from anti-satellite testing—especially from Russia and China—pose recurring challenges to the International Space Station and other assets, and they create long-lasting hazards that must be managed for generations. The reality is that debris cannot maneuver, so avoidance becomes a constant, resource-intensive activity. The United States’ approach to debris management is therefore about resilience: designing and operating satellites and spacecraft that can withstand a higher degree of uncertainty, developing maneuver capabilities to avoid debris clouds, and sharing practical mitigations with international partners to reduce the risk of future debris creation. The daily process of issuing debris notifications to potentially affected actors is an ongoing, unglamorous but crucial obligation that underpins the safety and sustainability of orbital operations.
In terms of transparency and dialogue with adversaries, Agrawal emphasizes that there is a genuine interest in expanding channels of technical exchange, even if the progress has been slow or intermittent. The goal is to reach a point where spaceflight safety is understood as a shared responsibility and where norms and best practices can emerge from a collaborative process rather than unilateral actions. Transparency, in this sense, is not a mere courtesy; it is a practical instrument for stabilizing a domain that is intensively used by both states and private companies. The hope is that continued dialogue could contribute to a more predictable space environment, where risk is managed openly, where key actors can coordinate during launches and debris events, and where the probability of rapid escalation can be minimized. As space becomes more central to how nations project power and deliver services to their citizens, the drive toward transparency and cooperative risk management grows more urgent—and more feasible—through sustained engagement and shared safety practices.
The 2007 pivot, Chance Saltzman, and the human memory of a turning point
The 2007 anti-satellite missile test by China is widely regarded as a turning point in space operations and policy. For those who lived through it, including Gen. Chance Saltzman, the moment was a "pivot point" that forced a rethinking of how space operations were conducted and how space assets would be protected in the future. Saltzman, who later became Space Force’s Chief of Space Operations, has described the event as a moment that forced the space community to change its mindset. He recalled that those responsible for space operations had to rethink their approach because the event revealed that space—unlike air, land, and sea domains—could be more vulnerable than previously understood. The incident underscored that a single test could drastically alter the orbital environment, adding debris, reshaping risk calculations, and pressing a fundamental question: How do we count the pieces, and how do we manage the consequences?
Agrawal was in the room during the 2007 events and recounts the shift in perspective that followed. He describes how the team was tasked with counting debris fragments, an effort that later revealed the significance of the event beyond its immediate effects. In hindsight, the 2007 ASAT test is seen as the moment when space operators recognized that the space environment would require new strategies, different criteria for threat assessment, and a broader, more integrated approach to space safety and security. The experience helped to catalyze the creation of the Space Force and the ongoing evolution of space doctrine. It also shaped Agrawal’s career by reinforcing the need to combine precise cataloging with anticipatory intelligence and to build systems that are resilient in the face of rapid and potentially destabilizing changes in space activity. The pivot point remains a reference point for contemporary policy debates about space warfare, deterrence, and the governance of a domain where traditional boundaries no longer neatly apply.
The interview with Agrawal also sheds light on how the Space Force uses historical moments to inform contemporary strategy. The reflection on 2007 serves as a reminder that the orbital environment is not a settled or static arena; it is a living system that evolves with technology, geopolitics, and commercial innovation. The memory of that turning point helps explain why Delta 2 and the Space Force more broadly place such emphasis on predictive analytics, risk-based resource allocation, and the careful integration of civil and commercial partners into the safety framework. The ability to count and characterize debris, to understand how events unfold over time, and to anticipate how an adversary might respond to a given maneuver all contribute to a more robust and resilient posture. The lesson is clear: preparedness, transparency, and a willingness to adapt are essential to maintaining space as a stable domain where essential services can flourish and where national security can be safeguarded.
Ars and Agrawal’s discussion also underscores a broader truth about space governance: the pace of change in orbital activity outstrips the speed of traditional policy processes. The Space Force must continuously translate evolving capabilities, new business models, and shifting international dynamics into concrete command-and-control decisions, allocation of resources, and alliance-building initiatives. The insights from Agrawal illuminate how a leader can navigate these complexities by combining a rigorous understanding of sensor data with a humane, mission-driven leadership style informed by his decades of service and his experience in education. The lessons from this interview extend beyond a single man or unit; they reveal how a modern space force can reconcile technical fidelity with strategic purpose, enabling a safer and more prosperous space domain for all who rely on it.
Policy shifts, budgets, and the evolving future of orbital warfare
The policy landscape surrounding space operations continues to evolve as the White House and Congress weigh how best to allocate resources and responsibilities for collision warnings, space safety, and national security. A notable point of discussion is the proposal to reallocate certain collision-warning duties away from the military toward civilian agencies, specifically the Office of Space Commerce. This proposed shift would align with a broader objective of focusing military resources on warfighting and national-security tasks while leveraging civilian expertise to handle non-molitical safety functions. The policy implications of such a change are substantial, touching on questions of accountability, data stewardship, and the appropriate division of labor among government agencies, the private sector, and international partners. In public discourse, proponents argue that civil agencies may be better suited to handle non-combat safety tasks, enabling the military to concentrate on core defense obligations while ensuring that civil space operations reflect a transparent, standards-based approach to safety.
What do these shifts mean for the Space Force’s doctrinal development and its operational posture? They suggest a future in which space safety is embedded in a broader, more inclusive governance framework that incorporates not only national defense but also civilian aviation safety, commercial risk management, and international cooperation. The practical effect is a more modular and cooperative approach to space safety that could reduce duplication of effort and improve response times when hazards arise. This is closely tied to the broader goal of maintaining space as a stable, predictable environment that continues to support critical services on Earth, such as communications, navigation, weather, and remote sensing. As policy debates unfold, the Space Force must translate political considerations into operational capabilities, investment decisions, and talent development that reflect the domain’s growing strategic significance.
In parallel, the Space Force continues to invest in technology to advance predictive capabilities, automate routine safety tasks, and enable more agile responses to evolving threats. The emphasis on self-monitoring launches, autonomous safety systems, and improved state vectors mirrors a broader trend in space operations toward resilience and efficiency. As commercial space activities expand, the need for clear standards and robust governance grows, prompting continued collaboration with the private sector and international partners to ensure that all actors adhere to shared norms and practices. Ultimately, the policy and budget dynamics surrounding space safety and orbital warfare are inseparable from the day-to-day work conducted by Delta 2 and its sister units. The outcome will shape how the United States maintains its space superiority while balancing the economic and strategic benefits of a vibrant, participatory space ecosystem.
Conclusion
The conversation with Col. Raj Agrawal offers a comprehensive portrait of a space era defined by data-driven insight, sophisticated risk management, and a robust public-private partnership. Mission Delta 2’s mission—tracking tens of thousands of objects, identifying a red order of battle of a couple thousand high-interest assets, and delivering a common operational picture that can withstand rapid change—illustrates how the Space Force is adapting to a crowded and increasingly contested orbital environment. The shift from Space Situational Awareness to Space Domain Awareness represents more than a rebranding; it signals a fundamental evolution in how the United States perceives space—from a realm of observation to a domain with strategic consequences, where intent, capability, and cooperation must all be weighed in parallel. Agrawal’s journey—from a Texas classroom to the command of a mission critical to national security—embodies the broader transformation of the space workforce: diverse, mission-focused, and oriented toward serving a public that increasingly depends on a safe, secure, and accessible space environment.
The “red object” concept anchors a disciplined approach to hazard assessment and risk prioritization, reminding us that not all space activities can be judged by traditional metrics alone. The examples of Shijian-20 and Shijian-24C crystallize the tension between scientific labeling and strategic interpretation, challenging policymakers and operators to distinguish between benign curiosity and potentially hostile action. At the same time, the push to incorporate commercial operators, such as Starlink and Kuiper, into the safety framework demonstrates a mature recognition that space is a shared domain where mutual responsibility translates into collective security. The ongoing dialogue with China and Russia—through notices, technical exchanges, and, when possible, joint efforts to reduce risk—reflects a pragmatic understanding that transparency can serve as a stabilizing force even amid geopolitical competition.
As policy debates continue and technology advances, the Space Force’s posture will likely evolve toward greater resilience, more integrated governance, and deeper collaboration across sectors and borders. The ultimate objective remains clear: to deliver space safety and space stability that protect critical services, enable scientific discovery, and sustain the strategic advantages that a modern nation depends upon in an era where space is both a frontier and a shared, interconnected arena. The narrative of Col. Agrawal and Mission Delta 2 offers not only a glimpse into a specific hour of governance but also a forward-looking blueprint for how a nation can navigate a world in which the heavens are full of activity—and full of potential for both cooperation and conflict.
