Millions of Apple AirPlay-enabled devices could be compromised over Wi-Fi, researchers warn, revealing a set of vulnerabilities dubbed AirBorne that allow attackers to move laterally across a network and execute malicious code on compromised AirPlay devices. The implications stretch from consumer speakers and TVs to car infotainment systems, highlighting how a single flaw in a widely deployed protocol can create footholds across dozens, if not hundreds, of device categories. This evolving threat raises urgent questions about patching, device diversity, and the fragility of home and workplace networks in the era of interconnected, wireless ecosystems.
What AirPlay is and why these flaws matter
AirPlay is Apple’s wireless streaming technology that enables iPhones and MacBooks to send music, photos, videos, and other content to compatible speakers, TVs, and third‑party devices that integrate the protocol. The value proposition is convenience: seamless transitions between devices, synchronized media playback, and a user experience that feels effortless across a growing landscape of hardware. The protocol relies on tightly integrated software and firmware across devices, with a software development kit (SDK) that allows third‑party manufacturers to embed AirPlay compatibility into speakers, receivers, set‑top boxes, and smart TVs.
The AirPlay ecosystem is inherently diverse. It spans mainstream consumer electronics, niche audio gear, and a growing number of in‑vehicle infotainment systems via adjacent implementations. This diversity, however, is a double‑edged sword. While it accelerates the reach and usefulness of AirPlay, it also distributes the responsibility for patching and updating across numerous vendors. When a single class of bugs exists in the shared AirPlay code path or in the AirPlay SDKs used by many manufacturers, the consequences multiply. Security researchers have long warned that broad software ecosystems become as strong as their weakest patch, and in the case of AirPlay, that weakness can persist long after fixes are developed if devices never receive them or if manufacturers are slow to deploy updates.
AirPlay’s design, which favors openness and extensibility to accommodate new devices and use cases, also introduces risk. When a service is designed to be open and ready for connections from new devices, it inevitably presents a larger surface area for exploitation. In practice, this means that vulnerabilities found in the AirPlay SDK or in related components can affect a wide range of devices—from smart speakers to televisions, and even to within cars that rely on AirPlay for in‑vehicle entertainment and control. The potential for attackers to exploit these flaws on a network‑level basis, and then to pivot to other devices on the same network, marks a shift from isolated bugs to systemic risks within households and organizations.
Researchers from the cybersecurity firm Oligo recently described a cluster of vulnerabilities, collectively termed AirBorne, that affect AirPlay. They indicate that bugs in Apple’s AirPlay SDK could enable hackers on the same Wi‑Fi network to hijack third‑party devices—such as speakers, receivers, set‑top boxes, and smart TVs—and take command of them or use them as a platform for further intrusion. In addition, a separate set of AirBorne flaws could have allowed attackers to exploit AirPlay on Apple devices themselves, though Apple has released updates that address these issues, and the company notes that exploitation would have depended on specific conditions, including changes to default AirPlay settings. The net effect is a spectrum of risk: some vulnerabilities were already patched, while others linger in devices that may be slow to update or that incorporate the AirPlay SDK through unverified channels.
The scope of AirBorne is broad. Oligo’s leadership estimates that potentially vulnerable third‑party AirPlay‑enabled devices run into the tens of millions. The reasons are straightforward: AirPlay is embedded in a wide variety of devices, and patching across so many manufacturers can be protracted or, in some cases, never fully realized. Gal Elbaz, Oligo’s chief technology officer and cofounder, emphasizes the scale of the issue, noting that “because AirPlay is supported in such a wide variety of devices, there are a lot that will take years to patch—or they will never be patched.” He underscores the systemic risk that arises when a single class of software vulnerability affects an ecosystem as large as AirPlay.
In the conversation surrounding the AirBorne findings, it’s important to recognize that the exposure is not solely about a single gadget or a particular brand. Rather, it is about the architecture of the AirPlay ecosystem and how third‑party integrations, patch cycles, and default configurations intersect to create real‑world risk. Oligo’s researchers stress that, even with patches from Apple or individual manufacturers, the sheer number of devices and the varying timetables for updates means that many vulnerable devices could remain susceptible for years. The challenge is not simply to fix a bug in one device but to coordinate a broad, multi‑vendor remediation across a sprawling and evolving device landscape.
AirBorne: What the vulnerabilities actually enable
Oligo’s investigations reveal two broad classes of AirBorne vulnerabilities, each with distinct implications for attackers and defenders. First, bugs within Apple’s AirPlay SDK that third‑party devices rely on could permit an attacker who shares the same Wi‑Fi network to hijack the target gadget. In practical terms, a hacker on a home, corporate, or public Wi‑Fi network could gain control of devices like speakers, receivers, or smart TVs if they are on the same local network. Once compromised, these devices can become footholds on the network, enabling the attacker to move laterally, access other devices, or install additional malicious software—a classic “island hopping” scenario in which the attacker uses one compromised device as a staging ground for broader access.
Second, a separate set of AirBorne flaws could have allowed exploitation of AirPlay‑enabled Apple devices themselves. Apple indicates that these exploits were dependent on particular configurations, and the company has rolled out updates to mitigate them. The practical takeaway is that, while the most direct route to compromise might involve devices that rely on AirPlay to connect, the patching status and configuration requirements significantly influence the likelihood of exploitation. Apple notes that attackers would need to be on the same Wi‑Fi network as the target to exploit certain bugs, which constrains the threat but does not eliminate it, especially in shared workspaces, multi‑tenant buildings, or public venues where many devices coexist on the same network.
During their demonstrations, Oligo researchers highlighted that the AirBorne exploit chain could be leveraged to covertly take over an AirPlay‑enabled Bose speaker, a scenario framed to illustrate the type of control attackers could achieve and the potential for a network‑level foothold. The demonstration, described by Oligo as a proof‑of‑concept, emphasizes how quickly a single compromised device could become a pivot point for broader intrusions or for enabling persistent access to the target network. The team stresses that they did not intend to single out any particular company; the Bose device used in testing was chosen because it was readily available for demonstration, not as an indictment of the brand.
The scope of AirBorne extends beyond consumer electronics into the realm of automotive systems through CarPlay, Apple’s interface for connecting iPhones to vehicle dashboards. Oligo warns that CarPlay‑enabled cars and trucks—more than 800 models in total—could become targets for hijacking the head unit that controls the vehicle’s dashboard. In these scenarios, however, the practical risk is constrained by how CarPlay is implemented: to exploit CarPlay vulnerabilities, an attacker would typically need to pair their own device with the vehicle’s head unit using Bluetooth or a USB connection. This pairing requirement imposes a significant hurdle, reducing the probability of a car being hijacked purely through nearby wireless adjacency. Nevertheless, the possibility that CarPlay vulnerabilities exist adds to the sense of urgency around patching and device hardening across the entire ecosystem.
Inside homes and offices, AirPlay remains one of the most prolific and visible wireless streaming protocols. The vulnerabilities discovered by Oligo—and the subsequent patches released by Apple and partner manufacturers—underscore a central tension: the more accessible a service is for seamless connections, the larger its exposure to malicious use. The team members emphasize that the risk is not simply about a single exploit but about real‑world scenarios in which attackers rely on weak update cycles, devices that are forgotten or neglected in maintenance routines, and the perennial challenge of ensuring every AirPlay‑enabled gadget in a network can be kept current with security fixes. Uri Katz, an Oligo researcher, expresses a common concern: “The amount of devices that were vulnerable to these issues—that’s what alarms me. When was the last time you updated your speaker?” This reflection highlights a familiar problem for many consumers and enterprises: patch fatigue, inconsistent patch management, and the tendency to overlook home devices that people assume are safe simply because they are “smart.”
Patch status, responses, and what remains at risk
Oligo’s team says they engaged with Apple for months to patch the AirBorne flaws across affected devices. Their collaboration aimed to validate fixes for Macs and other Apple hardware, with Apple subsequently releasing patches for related vulnerabilities that could have been exploited under certain conditions. Apple’s public statements emphasize that those bugs could only be exploited when attackers were on the same Wi‑Fi network as the victim and that the potential data exposure on devices such as TVs and speakers is generally limited. The company notes that patches exist for impacted third‑party devices, but the patching landscape remains uneven across vendors and product lines. In practical terms, this means that while the most dangerous attack vectors—network‑level access and persistence on a compromised device—are being mitigated where patches exist, a broad swath of devices may remain vulnerable if they have not received updates or if their manufacturers have not provided timely patches. The patching timeline across hundreds of models is inherently slow, leaving residual risk as newer AirPlay implementations emerge or as old hardware remains in active use without security updates.
The industry implications are significant. When third‑party manufacturers integrate Apple technologies like AirPlay via an SDK, Apple’s direct control over hardware and the patching process diminishes. Patrick Wardle, CEO of the Apple device‑focused security firm DoubleYou, notes that this dynamic creates a diffusion of responsibility: as soon as external vendors embed AirPlay, they bear responsibility for updates, but those updates can lag or never arrive. The result is a potential erosion of user trust in the broader Apple ecosystem when patches are unevenly applied across a diverse device landscape. The AirPlay ecosystem’s promise of interoperability and easy connectivity becomes a headache for security teams that must coordinate patches across multiple vendors, devices, and firmware versions. The patching challenge is particularly acute for devices that are subsidized or retired slowly, as well as for devices whose manufacturers have limited incentive to push updates after initial sales.
On the defensive side, Apple affirms that patches exist for the affected devices and emphasizes the importance of updating devices to reduce risk. Yet the company also stresses that practical exploits require proximity—an attacker must be on the same Wi‑Fi network as the target. This constraint reduces the probability of broad, campus‑ or city‑scale exploits, but it does not eliminate risk in environments where networks are shared by many users, such as apartments, dormitories, hotels, or corporate spaces. The patching challenge remains stubborn: even with patches, the sheer number of devices, the rate at which new models are introduced, and the long tail of older devices in use means that many devices could remain vulnerable for years.
Oligo also highlighted the possibility that some devices incorporate the AirPlay SDK without notifying Apple and becoming certified AirPlay devices. This uncoordinated integration creates an additional layer of complexity for patch management. If a device does not appear in Apple’s patching ecosystem or is not updated by its manufacturer, it could continue to harbor vulnerabilities even as other devices are secured. This underscores a broader industry imperative: when a major platform opens its core protocols to third‑party developers, it must establish robust, scalable mechanisms for ongoing vulnerability disclosure, patch validation, and end‑of‑life handling to minimize risk across the ecosystem.
From a consumer perspective, the takeaway is clear. Keeping AirPlay‑enabled devices up to date is essential, and network hygiene matters as well. The AirBorne findings remind users that a secure home or office network is not just about the router performing its duties; it’s also about ensuring all connected devices receive timely security updates. The reality is that many smart‑home devices—speakers, televisions, cameras, and other streaming gear—are not patched as aggressively as smartphones or PCs. The risk compounds within networks that allow devices to communicate with one another, creating a path for attackers to move laterally if one device is compromised. Practically, this means operating a security‑minded model for device maintenance: regular firmware updates, enabling automatic updates where possible, and maintaining an inventory of AirPlay‑enabled devices on the network to ensure patches are applied promptly.
Threat scenarios: how attackers could move within networks
The AirBorne vulnerabilities carry implications for both stealth and persistence. If a hacker gains access to the same Wi‑Fi network as vulnerable devices, they can attempt to take control of those devices. Once under control, an attacker can maintain a covert foothold or use the compromised device as a staging area to reach other targets on the same network. This capability raises the stakes for home and enterprise networks, where multiple devices share a common wireless environment and where valuable data or sensitive devices—ranging from computers to smart TVs to networked printers—could be at risk.
A particularly concerning aspect is the potential for micro‑targets to be exploited for espionage. Some vulnerable devices include microphones, which could be leveraged for audio capture and covert listening, enabling eavesdropping applications with minimal user awareness. While Oligo did not demonstrate a weaponized malware sample against a specific target in their public demonstrations, the researchers indicated that the vulnerability class could support such capabilities. The possibility of turning everyday speakers into listening devices and using compromised devices as listening posts on a network is the kind of threat model that security teams actively discuss in risk assessments for both homes and organizations.
The broader risk picture involves ransomware deployments, data exfiltration, and the use of compromised devices to coordinate attacks. A botnet of AirPlay devices—coordinated across a physical space or spanning multiple locations—could provide attackers with substantial bandwidth and reach. The use of AirPlay devices as footholds is attractive to attackers seeking low‑hurdle access points within a network, particularly in environments where patching is inconsistent and where devices sit on the edge of the security perimeter. The risk is not merely theoretical; it rests on the reality that millions of devices are potentially in need of updates and that attackers frequently target devices that are overlooked in routine security practices.
The CarPlay angle adds another layer to the risk calculus. While the ability to target a head unit via CarPlay requires proximity and specific pairing steps, the sheer volume of CarPlay‑enabled vehicles—over 800 models—means that even a limited exploit surface could affect a substantial number of cars. The necessity of Bluetooth or USB pairing makes direct, automated exploitation less likely in the wild, but it does not render the threat negligible. In scenarios where criminals can convince a vehicle owner to connect a compromised device, or where physical access to a vehicle is possible, the potential for impact increases. This dynamic underscores the importance of secure communications and careful device handling in the automotive interface that many modern drivers take for granted.
The practical conclusion for individuals and organizations is that AirBorne represents a category of risk that is both ubiquitous and stubborn. Home networks with multiple AirPlay devices, enterprise environments with conference rooms and shared entertainment systems, and vehicles that rely on CarPlay—all are pieces of a large, interconnected puzzle. The combination of widespread device adoption, long patch cycles, and the possibility of microtargeted exploitation means that risk management must be continuous, disciplined, and collaborative across platform makers, device manufacturers, and end users.
Industry implications: trust, patching, and the path forward
The AirBorne disclosures illuminate a fundamental tension between the benefits of interoperable protocols and the challenges of maintaining security across a sprawling ecosystem. When Apple enables AirPlay across a broad set of devices through an SDK, it delegates some responsibility for patching to third‑party manufacturers. This devolution of control complicates vulnerability management and raises questions about accountability and long‑term security guarantees. Wardle emphasizes that third‑party integration without direct oversight of patch schedules creates a governance gap that can undermine user confidence in the broader ecosystem. The risk is not limited to a single brand’s devices; it spans the entire AirPlay chain, as new devices continue to ship with the SDK and the potential for new vulnerabilities remains.
From a security operations perspective, the AirBorne case presents a blueprint for how ecosystem‑level risks should be handled. It underscores the value of coordinated vulnerability disclosure, independent testing, and transparent communication among platform owners, device manufacturers, and users. It also highlights the importance of defense‑in‑depth measures that do not rely solely on patching. Network segmentation, device isolation, endpoint monitoring, and user education all play critical roles in limiting the blast radius of any future exploits. In environments with high security requirements—corporate campuses, healthcare settings, or government facilities—these lessons become even more salient, given the likelihood that patch adoption remains uneven and that attackers often target the easiest path to high‑value assets.
Apple’s response emphasizes ongoing patching of vulnerable components and the aversion to exposing attackers to easy targets by discouraging exploitation in settings where attackers cannot easily reach infected devices. The company notes that there are operational limits to the attacks, given the requirement that an attacker be on the same Wi‑Fi network for a subset of the exploits. While this constraint reduces the probability of remote exploitation, it reinforces the ongoing need for vigilant update practices and device management. The broader lesson is that security for open, widely adopted protocols depends not only on rapid patch release but on an aligned ecosystem of manufacturers who consistently apply those patches across all product lines, including devices that have longer lifecycles or more complex hardware configurations.
For consumers, the AirBorne disclosures are a reminder to treat every connected device as a potential risk vector. The best‑practice takeaway is not to disable AirPlay outright but to manage it responsibly: keep firmware and software up to date, enable automatic updates where available, and monitor devices for unusual behavior that could indicate compromise. In addition, network hygiene—segregating IoT devices on guest networks, using strong Wi‑Fi security, and limiting unnecessary interconnections between devices—can help reduce risk. The ongoing challenge is balancing user convenience with security, especially as the number of AirPlay‑enabled devices in homes and workplaces continues to grow.
Practical guidance for users: reducing risk in everyday environments
- Regularly check for updates on all AirPlay‑enabled devices, including speakers, smart TVs, receivers, and any third‑party gadgets that implement the AirPlay SDK. Where possible, enable automatic updates to ensure patches are applied promptly.
- Review AirPlay settings on devices and adjust default configurations that could expose devices to risk. For example, if a setting that exposes AirPlay services to the local network is enabled by default, evaluate whether you actually need it and disable it if not.
- Segment your network to limit lateral movement. Place IoT devices on a separate network segment or guest network, isolating them from primary workstations and sensitive servers. This reduces the potential reach of any single compromised device.
- Maintain an inventory of AirPlay‑enabled devices in your environment. Knowing what devices exist and their patch status helps security teams prioritize remediation efforts and track vulnerable devices over time.
- Consider physical and environmental controls in environments where CarPlay and other vehicle interfaces are used. Ensure vehicles’ infotainment systems are updated and minimize opportunities for unauthorized proximity access to head units.
- Exercise caution in public or semi‑public Wi‑Fi environments. If possible, avoid configuring AirPlay devices to automatically connect to networks without user oversight, and use trusted networks with proper segmentation.
- Monitor for unusual device behavior, such as unexpected microphone activity, unusual network traffic from AirPlay devices, or unfamiliar devices appearing on your network’s management dashboards. Early detection can prevent sustained exploitation.
- Educate users in households and organizations about the importance of patching and secure configuration practices. User awareness remains a critical line of defense alongside technical controls.
Conclusion
AirPlay, a technology designed for seamless, cross‑device media experiences, has become a focal point for a new class of security concerns that arise when a critical protocol is embedded across a diverse and rapidly expanding ecosystem. The AirBorne vulnerabilities identified by Oligo reveal the perils of patch management in an environment where hundreds of device models and countless configurations share a common codebase. While patches have been issued and exploitation in the wild may be mitigated by proximity and patch status, the risk remains real for devices that fail to receive timely updates or that are integrated in ways that complicate remediation.
The research underscores the importance of robust, coordinated defense strategies that span platform owners, device manufacturers, and end users. It also reinforces a broader truth about modern security: as devices proliferate and connect in new ways, the responsibility to secure them increases in pace and scope. For consumers, the practical, actionable steps are clear—keep devices updated, maintain diligent network hygiene, and adopt secure practices that reduce exposure across the entire AirPlay ecosystem. In a landscape where convenience and openness define product design, proactive security management becomes essential to preserve user trust and to keep the increasingly connected home and workplace resilient against evolving threats.
