A veteran Space Force commander who spent two years overseeing the tracking of tens of thousands of human-made objects in orbit sheds light on how the job has evolved. He explains why the distinction between simply knowing where objects are and understanding their potential intent matters now more than ever as orbital warfare becomes a strategic consideration. The interview also reveals how commercial operators, including Starlink and Kuiper, interact with military space traffic management, and why transparency and coordination with international partners are central to keeping space sustainable and usable for everyone. The conversation covers lessons from past anti-satellite tests, the current debris environment, and the ongoing debate over who should handle collision warnings going forward.
The Delta 2 Mission and the Modern Challenge of Orbital Traffic Management
For two years, Col. Raj Agrawal led the U.S. military unit responsible for tracking nearly 50,000 artificial objects whizzing through space. In this role, he acted as the custodian of the orbital catalog, guiding teams tasked with determining whether satellites from other nations—chiefly China and Russia—pose peaceful intentions or represent a military threat to U.S. forces. The job today sits at the intersection of traditional cataloging and the emergence of orbital warfare, a field that demands not only precise location data but also an understanding of intent, potential patterns, and vulnerability analysis.
Agrawal’s unit, Mission Delta 2, operates from Peterson Space Force Base in Colorado and collects and fuses data from a broad network of sensors. The mission has been described as identifying, characterizing, and exploiting opportunities to mitigate vulnerabilities in orbit, a statement that highlights the dual nature of space operations: ensuring safety and seeking strategic advantage. The unit has matured into a capability that combines radars, telescopes, intelligence analysis, and geocentric space terrain mapping to deliver a combat-ready common operational picture to military commanders. This standard has evolved from a straightforward task—knowing where objects are in space—to a much more complex enterprise: distinguishing which objects could enable a hostile action or threaten U.S. space assets.
The Space Force has framed these duties within a broader concept of space superiority, a development driven by the recognition that space is already a contested domain. The modernization of Delta 2 reflects a shift away from mere surveillance toward proactive risk assessment and threat anticipation. In practice, that means moving from simply cataloging trackable objects to integrating predictive intelligence that can forecast which objects or conjunctions might require defense or mitigation measures. As Agrawal explains, the focus is less on mapping every solitary satellite and more on concentrating resources on the handful of high-risk elements that could disrupt operations or threaten critical infrastructure in space.
The implication for daily operations is significant. A robust network of sensors—ground-based radars, space-based sensors, and sophisticated analytical systems—produces a vast stream of data. The challenge is to filter this stream into actionable intelligence that supports commanders and civilian agencies alike. The setup commissions a synchronized view of space activity that melds traditional tracking with forward-looking assessments. This enables a joint posture that can respond quickly to evolving threats while maintaining a reliable space environment for commercial and civil use. The complexity of this mission is amplified by the fact that space is vast, and phenomena such as orbital debris can obscure or distort the picture, necessitating advanced modeling and continuous calibration across multiple agencies and partners.
Beyond the technical operations, Delta 2’s mission also has a policy and governance dimension. The unit operates under a framework that includes joint doctrine, interagency collaboration, and international engagement to reduce the chance of misunderstandings in proximity operations or misinterpretations of adversarial actions. The aim is to produce a shared situational awareness that supports both national security objectives and the safety of spaceflight for commercial operators and international partners. In practical terms, that translates to coordinated notifications about potential close approaches and careful coordination of orbital traffic management with civilian authorities where appropriate, while preserving the military’s own decision-making authority.
The story of Delta 2 is also a narrative about how the service has reorganized to address modern space threats. The 18th Space Defense Squadron—historically at the center of space domain awareness—formed the core of early attempts to manage orbital traffic, but as the domain matured, the Space Force restructured responsibilities to ensure broader coverage, redundancy, and agility. Mission Delta 2 now embodies a more expansive approach that seeks to harmonize acquisition, software development, cyber defense, and intelligence to sustain a robust, adaptable posture in a rapidly changing space environment. The goal is not simply to react to incidents but to anticipate potential problems and to create a decision-making fabric that allows for rapid, coordinated responses across military, civil, and commercial contexts.
The operational tempo of Delta 2 reflects a broader reality: tracking objects in space is no longer a purely observational exercise. The ability to predict, interpret, and respond to activities in space has become a central capability for ensuring the safety and security of U.S. national interests, allied interests, and the global community that depends on space-based services. As the field evolves, Delta 2’s work transcends the past boundaries of cataloging and moves toward an integrated, multi-domain approach to space operations that blends science, policy, and strategic foresight.
Space Domain Awareness versus Space Situational Awareness: A Shift in Focus and Organization
The Space Force’s shift from Space Situational Awareness (SSA) to Space Domain Awareness (SDA) marks a fundamental reorientation in how the military conceptualizes, organizes, and executes its space operations. SSA traditionally refers to the knowledge produced by sensors—data about the where and when of space objects. It is often accessible to a broad set of actors, including academia, industry, and international partners. SDA, by contrast, represents a domain-focused framework designed to translate space knowledge into measurable, warfighting outcomes. It is not merely about cataloging or recognizing what exists in space; it is about understanding how to operate effectively in a space-enabled battlespace to achieve strategic objectives.
General terms aside, the practical implications of this transition are substantial. SDA integrates a broader spectrum of capabilities and responsibilities than SSA did. It encompasses sustainment activities such as software development, cyber defense, intelligence support, and the ongoing acquisition of space capability to ensure that the joint force can prevail in contested space. The leadership recognizes that the space domain is not a visible theater like air, land, or sea; rather, it is an invisible yet highly consequential space defined by the complex interplay of sensors, data processing, and predictive models that describe how objects behave and how those behaviors could align with strategic intents.
A key point in the transformation is the realization that space operators cannot rely on a static or complete picture. The reality is dynamic: objects can maneuver, state vectors evolve, and new players continuously join the field. This makes the “reality” of the space domain a social construct—produced by the sensors, algorithms, and decision-makers who interpret data and decide how to respond. The shared reality is the product of millions of data points processed in real time and with a forward-looking lens that seeks to anticipate risk before it crystallizes into a threat. The outcome is an operational environment in which the joint force can act preemptively to protect critical assets.
To manage this transition, Mission Delta 2 was created as a focal point for integrating SDA with other operational disciplines. The unit’s mandate is to combine traditional SDA tasks with the elements of defense, intelligence, and cyber operations that are necessary to address modern space threats. The result is a more distributed and adaptable structure, where components with specialized roles contribute to a synthetic picture that can be rapidly updated as the situation changes. The aim is to ensure that every level of command—from tactical teams to strategic planners—has access to a unified, decision-ready stream of information and recommendations.
Agrawal notes that the shift involves both a redefinition of space-domain terms and a reallocation of responsibilities. Specifically, while the 18th Space Defense Squadron may once have occupied the central hub of SDA activity, Delta 2’s formation spreads critical functions across multiple units. This dispersion is intentional: it enables rapid shifts in mission emphasis, such as quickly pivoting to cyber defense or contingency operations without bottlenecks. It also helps prevent single points of failure in an increasingly congested orbital ecosystem. The broader point is that space operations must be designed to respond to a spectrum of contingencies—from routine tracking to high-stakes, time-sensitive actions in response to hostile maneuvers or unexpected events.
A technical nuance that underpins SDA’s advantage over SSA lies in the treatment of data. SSA has long treated space tracking as a matter of position and velocity—a straightforward, predictive challenge. The move to SDA introduces a more sophisticated framework that uses state vectors and anticipatory modeling to forecast how objects will behave under various circumstances. The emphasis shifts from merely cataloging to forecasting, from a passive compilation of data to an active, decision-oriented process. This transition is critical because it equips military planners to predict potential threats before they materialize, enabling more effective risk mitigation and force protection.
Beyond its internal reorganization, the SDA framework also envisions a closer alignment with commercial and civil space activities. The mutual sharing of data, the pre-coordination of state vectors, and the development of joint safety protocols are all characteristic of a more integrated approach. The Office of Space Commerce, for example, is increasingly drawn into these discussions as agencies explore how to offload non-military space-safety tasks to civilian authorities while preserving the National Security Council’s oversight for strategic protections. The overarching objective is a safer, more transparent space environment that still preserves the United States’ ability to defend national interests if deterrence fails.
The practical outcomes of this shift are evident in everyday operations. Not only do operators exchange conjunction notices with commercial partners, but the notification regime also informs allied and civilian entities about potential close approaches well in advance. The result is a more predictable space environment in which safe operations are more feasible, and the risk of unintended escalations or misinterpretations can be reduced. In a domain where a single miscalculation can cascade into a larger conflict, the SDA mindset seeks to align incentives across multiple actors toward a common operational tempo and safety standard.
The Red Order of Battle: Identifying and Tracking High-Interest Objects in Orbit
Among the most telling developments discussed in the interview is the concept of a "red order of battle"—a curated list of roughly 2,000 to 2,200 high-interest objects that are anticipated to act in ways that deviate from normal, predictable behavior. These objects are not merely pieces of debris; they are assets whose actions could significantly influence the security landscape, either through capabilities that rival military interests or through anomalous behavior that warrants heightened scrutiny. The red order of battle represents a focused effort to anticipate which objects might pose outsized risks, allowing the intelligence apparatus to prioritize its attention and resources accordingly.
This approach marks a shift from a broad cataloging mindset toward an intelligence-driven risk assessment framework. The idea is to maintain a dynamic, prioritized portfolio of assets that require additional monitoring, deeper analysis, and possibly preemptive mitigation strategies. In practice, this means that analysts are not simply watching for where an object is or where it is headed; they are evaluating why an object might be behaving in a certain way, what its operators might intend, and how those behaviors could affect other satellites, ground infrastructure, or national security interests. The goal is to anticipate contingencies rather than merely react to them.
Two examples of objects that have grown to symbolize the red order of battle are Shijian-20 and Shijian-24C. The former has been described as a technical demonstration satellite that has evaded inspection, while the latter has displayed behavior akin to "dogfighting" in space. Official characterizations frame these assets as scientific or experimental, but the observable behaviors raise serious questions about intent and the potential for non-cooperative actions. The Space Force must weigh these behaviors against the norms of international conduct and the risk they pose to critical assets in orbit. Deciding whether such behavior constitutes hostility, a provocation, or a hazard is a nuanced process that relies on a careful, legally informed analysis of actions, intentions, and potential escalatory consequences.
Agrawal emphasizes that the most reliable predictor of hazardous orbital behavior is a lack of coordination with the international community, especially during launches, maneuvers, or the deployment of large constellations. The absence of coordination is interpreted as a signal of risk, whereas coordinated activity—especially with international partners and commercial operators—tends to be managed with reciprocal transparency and mitigations. The red objects therefore become focal points for heightened vigilance, informing not only ongoing surveillance but also the allocation of resources to ensure that potential threats are understood, tracked, and mitigated in a manner that preserves the safety of all space actors.
Within Mission Delta 2 and its allied units, the red order of battle is integrated into a broader framework of threat assessment and response planning. The analysts aim to determine if a given object’s behavior might be considered a hostile act, an escalatory step, or simply a benign anomaly. Such determinations carry real consequences for how militaries coordinate with international partners and assess the risk to critical infrastructure such as missile-warning systems, navigation networks, and communications satellites. The discussion around red objects underscores a broader policy and operational philosophy: better to acknowledge and prepare for contested space than to pretend that all space activities proceed without risk. This mindset places a premium on intelligence-led decision-making, cross-domain coordination, and a disciplined approach to escalation management.
In practical terms, the red order of battle informs how Delta 2 and its partners allocate resources across the orbit. It shapes mission-planning, risk modeling, and the prioritization of sensors, data fusion, and predictive analytics. It also influences how the joint force interfaces with commercial space operators who must plan their own activities with an awareness of potential interference, risk, or mutual dependence. The emphasis on high-interest objects does not imply hostility toward specific actors; rather, it reflects a prudent, proactive strategy to safeguard space operations in an era when space assets are increasingly central to national security, commerce, and daily life on the ground.
Engagement with Commercial Space: Starlink, Kuiper, and a Shared Responsibility
A notable theme in Agrawal’s discussion is the cooperative relationship between the Space Force’s Mission Delta 2 and civil and commercial space operators, particularly major constellations such as Starlink and Kuiper. The dynamic is framed around data sharing, collaboration on flight plans, and joint safety practices that help deconflict busy orbital lanes and reduce the risk of collisions. The good-faith collaboration with these operators stands in contrast to a world where space actors act in silos or pursue unilateral interests at the expense of global space safety.
The interviewer notes that Starlink actively coordinates flight plans and shares orbital data, a practice that is mirrored by Amazon’s Kuiper constellation. The Space Force describes these commercial partners as highly cooperative, with a willingness to adapt their operations to maintain a safe and stable space environment. This ongoing coordination extends beyond simple notices of potential conjunctions. It includes pre-coordination of state vectors and more generalized alignment of orbital operations to ensure that the broader community can operate with a predictable risk profile. The Office of Space Commerce is increasingly brought into these conversations, signaling a formalization of civilian authority in aspects of space safety that were once handled exclusively by the military.
Technological advances have further facilitated this cooperation. Modern launches and on-board monitoring systems enable some degree of autonomous safety management, reducing the need for constant battlefield-like oversight. Commercial entities can monitor and report their own safety metrics, and, in many cases, they will initiate corrective action if a risk to the public arises. This self-monitoring capability is a major evolution in space operations, broadening the safety ecosystem beyond government-operated sensors. It also highlights a shared responsibility: both public and private sectors must maintain safe and sustainable space operations, and both must be prepared to adjust operations in response to evolving threats or opportunities.
The relationship with commercial operators also carries strategic implications. When private companies coordinate with military authorities, they contribute to a more robust, multi-layered safety net that benefits users of space-based services worldwide. The collaboration helps ensure that launches, maneuvers, and the deployment of megaconstellations occur in ways that minimize risk to other satellites, ground infrastructure, and human activity. The approach fosters a culture of transparency and trust in which rapid communication and mutual adjustment become the norm rather than the exception.
In practice, this synergy is not limited to SpaceX and Starlink. It extends to allied and partner nations, as well as close friends in the international space community. The aim is to standardize best practices and to align expectations around safety, accountability, and response protocols. The evolving relationship between military SDA capabilities and civil-commercial space activity suggests a future in which space safety is a shared, globally accepted responsibility, not a purely national prerogative. The ultimate objective is a space environment that remains accessible, secure, and conducive to scientific discovery and commercial innovation.
Debris, Risk, and the Reality of Modern Orbital Conflict
A central theme of the interview is the practical reality of debris and the ever-present risk of collision in a congested orbital environment. The early days of space activity saw a relatively stable catalog of objects, but a sequence of events since 2007—highlighted by China’s anti-satellite test that created thousands of debris fragments—fundamentally changed how the world analyzes orbital risk. The resulting debris clouds, along with subsequent collisions and launch activities, have driven a dramatic uptick in the number of trackable objects and the frequency of conjunction warnings. The United States now routinely issues hundreds of millions of conjunction notices per year, underscoring the scale and complexity of modern orbital operations.
The 2007 ASAT test was a pivotal moment in space history. It demonstrated that orbital debris can be generated at scale, reshaping the battlefield logic of space operations. The event led to a dramatic shift in how agencies plan, monitor, and respond to space activities. Col. Saltzman, who would become Space Force Chief of Space Operations, described that moment as a pivot point that forced a new way of thinking about space operations. Agrawal’s own experience during the years following that test gave him a first-hand sense of how the space domain had changed and how the presence of debris could complicate mission planning and operations for years to come.
The debris environment has escalated into a persistent, generational challenge. Debris from anti-satellite tests can travel in clouds that wrap around the Earth every 90 minutes, creating segments of orbit that become unusable for extended periods. The ISS and other high-value assets have repeatedly faced threats from these debris clouds, prompting maneuvering and risk mitigation strategies that require precise coordination among international partners. The reality is that some portions of orbital paths become effectively off-limits due to debris risk, and the consequences require ongoing, long-term solutions—from improved debris modeling to better end-of-life disposal practices for satellites.
The size and density of Low Earth Orbit (LEO) traffic remain one of the most difficult operational environments to manage. Despite advances in radar and telescope coverage, there are gaps in visibility, especially when objects approach each other at high speeds. The risk profile is compounded by the fact that many objects are not operated by states but by private entities whose orbital adjustments may be planned, partially planned, or reactive. The Space Force’s emphasis on predictive intelligence and a more formalized risk assessment framework is aimed at reducing the likelihood of uncontrolled or escalatory maneuvers that could trigger a wider crisis in space.
In practice, conjunction notices have become a daily part of space operations. The data flow involves not only the United States but also international partners, commercial operators, and civil space agencies. Debris from ASAT tests has forced the space community to devise more robust deconfliction strategies, including better state vector sharing, near-real-time tracking, and frequent coordination with all stakeholders involved. The long-term implications include a renewed push for international norms against debris-generating activities, standardization of space traffic management practices, and more resilient satellite designs that can withstand or avoid debris-induced hazards.
Moreover, the collision risk is a global public safety issue because space-derived services—GPS, weather forecasting, communications, and civilian infrastructure—depend on space infrastructure that is vulnerable to disruption. The reality is that debris management, collision avoidance, and sustainable practices are not only military concerns; they are essential to everyday life on Earth. The interview emphasizes that solutions require continued investment, international cooperation, and a shared commitment to reducing debris and ensuring safer, more predictable operations for decades to come.
Toward Greater Transparency: China, Russia, and the Trade in Space Information
A recurring topic in the discussion is the steady flow of conjunction notices to China and Russia and the broader question of how adversaries respond to these signals. The U.S. Space Force notes that it sends debris and conjunction notifications to China and Russia on a regular basis, often as a matter of routine safety and risk management. The goal is to foster better coordination and, eventually, to reduce the uncertainties that can lead to misinterpretations or inadvertent escalations. The reality highlighted by Agrawal is that while Russia has rarely responded to these notices in recent years, China has responded on a few occasions. The cross-national dynamic is nuanced, reflecting a balance between transparency, strategic signaling, and the sensitive nature of strategic competition in space.
Efforts to open channels for technical exchanges have encountered interruptions and delays, often influenced by domestic factors within the countries involved. Earlier discussions about establishing more formal technical exchanges in spaceflight safety were cited as promising but were interrupted by holiday periods and other disruptions. The broad desire remains: to establish a more predictable, safe space operating environment through greater transparency and dialogue. The hope is that through continued engagement, both sides could work toward shared safety norms and more reliable information exchange practices that reduce the risk of misinterpretation or inadvertent hostility.
When asked about the mechanics of sending notices to China and Russia, Agrawal confirms that the practice is indeed ongoing and widespread. The reality of orbital operations is such that debris clouds and conjunctions require constant attention, and notifying counterpart agencies is part of an effort to sustain spaceflight safety and mutual understanding. The broader aim is to foster a workable, transparent system in which space activities are conducted with predictable consequences and established lines of communication, even as political and strategic tensions continue to shape how nations operate in space.
The conversation also touches on broader questions about credibility and accountability. For the United States, maintaining an open line of communication about space activity is part of a broader effort to demonstrate a commitment to safe, predictable operations in space. The rules of engagement and the thresholds for what constitutes a hostile act remain legally and policy-grounded issues that Space Command and related authorities navigate in collaboration with diplomatic channels and the State Department. The hope is that repeated conversations, even when not yielding immediate consensus, will gradually cultivate norms that reduce risk and escalation potential in a domain where misperception can have outsized consequences.
In this evolving environment, the role of international cooperation and normative frameworks becomes increasingly important. The shared objective is to ensure that space remains accessible, transparent, and usable for scientific research, commercial ventures, and national security alike. The challenges are not merely technical but diplomatic and strategic, requiring ongoing dialogue about safety standards, information sharing, and the governance of a domain that belongs to the international community as a whole.
Policy, Budget, and the Future of Orbital Governance
Looking ahead, the policy and budget dimensions of space domain operations shape how the United States will balance military readiness with civil and commercial space activities. The interview references a White House budget request that would cancel a policy transferring collision-avoidance responsibilities from the Space Force to the Department of Commerce. The outcome of that policy decision would influence how the United States allocates resources, who leads in space safety and traffic management, and how civilian agencies partner with the military to maintain a safe operating environment in orbit.
In uniform, Agrawal notes, alignment with policy is the operating principle. The Space Force informs policy decisions, and once policy decisions are made, the service aligns its support accordingly. This underscores a practical reality: the dynamic landscape of space governance requires both strategic foresight and flexibility in implementation. The potential reallocation of responsibilities to civilian agencies could ease some military burdens, enabling the Space Force to concentrate resources on national security objectives, while empowering the Office of Space Commerce and other civilian bodies to lead certain facets of space safety for civilian and commercial actors.
The budgeting landscape also reflects the growing complexity of space operations. As orbital traffic becomes busier and more complicated, there is a continual push for investments in sensors, data processing capabilities, and interoperability across agencies and partners. The goal is to sustain a robust, resilient space environment that can support a wide range of activities—from national defense to scientific research and commercial services. The tension between security objectives and civil/commercial interests requires careful policy design to preserve strategic advantages while enabling innovation and economic growth.
From a strategic viewpoint, the shift toward Space Domain Awareness indicates an intent to operationalize space as a domain where military objectives are achievable and measurable. The adoption of an outcomes-focused mindset has implications for doctrine, training, and interagency collaboration. As missions expand beyond mere detection to include predictive analysis and proactive risk management, the Space Force will need to cultivate new skills, forge stronger partnerships with international allies, and ensure that its capabilities adapt to rapid technological advances in sensing, artificial intelligence, and autonomous systems. All of these elements converge in a trajectory toward a space governance framework that supports stability, resilience, and responsible leadership in the outer domain.
The Human Element in a High-Technology Arena
Beyond the technical and policy dimensions, the interview highlights the personal arc of Col. Agrawal—a Texas schoolteacher who became a Space Force leader—underscoring how individual backgrounds shape leadership in complex, high-stakes environments. Before joining the military, Agrawal taught music and mathematics at Trimble Technical High School in Fort Worth, a role that he says deeply informed his sense of service and community. He describes his students as coming from challenging circumstances and emphasizes how his involvement with their families helped illustrate the broader value of service. This personal history resonates with a broader theme: leadership in space operations demands not only technical expertise but also a commitment to mentorship, education, and public service.
Agrawal’s path to space operations shows a blend of disciplines, including early ambitions in music, transitional experiences in space operations education, and ultimately a leadership role in a field that merges science, policy, and national security. The narrative emphasizes that the skills developed in education—patience, communication, and the ability to translate complex ideas into understandable concepts—translate effectively into high-stakes operations where decisions must be made quickly and clearly. The intersection of education and defense in his career illustrates a broader truth about space leadership: success depends as much on human judgment and collaboration as on the most advanced sensor technology.
Throughout the interview, Agrawal repeatedly emphasizes the importance of transparency and alignment with policy. His perspective reinforces the idea that technological capability is meaningful only when it is integrated with a well-considered legal and diplomatic framework. The goal is not to create a space force that acts in isolation but to develop a robust ecosystem in which military, civil, and commercial actors can contribute to a stable, safe, and sustainable space environment. This shared responsibility is essential for maintaining the kind of predictable orbital domain that modern society relies on for everything from navigation to communications to climate monitoring.
In sum, the Delta 2 leadership narrative, the evolution of SDA, the red order of battle, and the growing collaboration with commercial space providers together paint a picture of a space domain that is increasingly dynamic, interconnected, and consequential for national security and daily life on Earth. The story underscores the need for continuous innovation, prudent policy shifts, and a commitment to cooperative, transparent practices that protect safety and enable the growth of space-based commerce and research.
Conclusion
The interview with Col. Raj Agrawal offers a comprehensive look at how the U.S. Space Force is transforming its approach to space operations. The move from traditional space situational awareness to a more strategic space domain awareness reflects a shift from pure tracking to outcome-oriented defense, intelligence, and governance. The red order of battle concept highlights the increasing emphasis on high-impact objects that require proactive monitoring and analysis. The close collaboration with commercial operators like Starlink and Kuiper demonstrates a model of shared responsibility in which industry and government work together to keep space safe, navigable, and productive for global communities. The debris environment, the incidents that shaped policy, and the ongoing diplomacy with China and Russia all illustrate the interwoven nature of space security, technology, and international relations.
As policy makers weigh funding and organizational changes, the Space Force’s emphasis on predictive intelligence, cross-domain integration, and international cooperation will likely continue to shape how the United States approaches space as a contested domain. The overarching aim remains clear: to protect critical space assets, enable economic and scientific activity, and maintain a predictable, accountable framework for activities in orbit. In this evolving landscape, leadership that blends technical acumen with strategic vision and a commitment to collaboration will be essential to navigating both the opportunities and the risks of operating a complex, increasingly congested orbital commons. The quest for a stable, safe, and transparent space environment continues to be a shared mission that spans the military, civil authorities, and private enterprise—and it will define the next era of space leadership.
