A wave of marketing-driven hype around passkeys is meeting sober scrutiny, as researchers challenge the notion that passkeys are an unbreakable fortress. The controversy centers on SquareX’s DEFCON-presented claims of a “major passkey vulnerability,” which purportedly undermines the security guarantees touted by Apple, Google, Microsoft, and countless others that have embraced passkeys as a modern alternative to passwords. Critics argue that the presentation conflates a security weakness in the endpoint or registration process with a flaw in the core FIDO/WebAuthn model, and that the study’s framing serves a marketing objective rather than a rigorous security assessment. This discourse matters because it shapes user trust and enterprise risk management at a moment when passkeys are increasingly marketed as a foundational defense against phishing, credential stuffing, and data breaches.
The Hype, SquareX’s Claim, and the DEFCON Stage
SquareX, a security startup marketing browser and client-side protections, released research labeled Passkeys Pwned, which it described as demonstrating a vulnerability capable of compromising passkeys and thus eroding trust in the security promises of major tech platforms. The researchers asserted that the attack could render passkeys vulnerable, counterintuitively suggesting that a system designed to resist phishing and credential theft could be undermined by a malicious extension and a phishing-based social-engineering campaign.
The core demonstration, as outlined in the DEFCON presentation, involved a malicious browser extension installed via social engineering. Once active, the extension allegedly hijacks the process by which a passkey is created for use across services such as Gmail, Microsoft 365, and the many other sites that now support passkeys. The technical claim is that the extension manipulates the registration workflow, causing the attacker to generate and bind a keypair to the legitimate domain (for instance, gmail.com) while the malware retains control of the keypair throughout the process. In practical terms, the attacker would then gain access to cloud applications and services that organizations rely on for sensitive operations.
SquareX framed this as a dramatic counterpoint to the widely held belief that passkeys are immune to theft or misuse. In the draft version of their paper, the researchers argued that the attack demonstrates not merely a vulnerability but a systemic weakness: that passkey security can be compromised through endpoint-focused manipulation, and that the perceived security edge of passkeys—often described as resistant to phishing and credential theft—rests on an assumption that may not hold in real-world, user-endpoint scenarios.
However, the criticisms surrounding this claim are pointed. Critics note that the attack described targets the registration phase and relies on social engineering to introduce a malicious extension. The argument is that, within the FIDO/WebAuthn threat model, stolen or manipulated credentials are not the same as a legitimate passkey that has been exfiltrated from a user’s authenticator. The defender’s position is that, if a user has already registered a passkey for a site like Gmail, that passkey remains securely stored on the user’s authenticator and is not “stolen” through a hijacked registration; at most, a malicious actor could interfere with the creation of a new, attacker-controlled key, potentially blocking legitimate login attempts or enabling a compromised key to be associated with a different site during a new registration.
In their exchanges with Ars Technica, SquareX’s lead developer, Shourya Pratap Singh, argued that because the attacker can bind a passkey to a legitimate site, the passkey is effectively stolen. He contended that the defense lies in recognizing that passkeys are not designed to be immune to all forms of endpoint compromise, and that the research aims to illuminate the real-world client-side risks that must be accounted for alongside the formal security properties of FIDO/WebAuthn. The response from many security observers has been to emphasize that the attack lies at the intersection of malware, browser extension abuse, and user-driven registration flows—not in the intrinsic security guarantees of passkeys themselves when used correctly within the defined threat model.
Why this matters for end users and organizations is twofold. First, it underscores the need to consider endpoint hygiene as an integral part of any authentication strategy. If the device or browser is compromised, many security assurances can erode regardless of the underlying authentication method. Second, it calls for precise articulation of threat models and realistic limitations of even the strongest authentication protocols. The debate therefore pivots on whether the perceived risk is a fundamental flaw in passkeys or an artifact of endpoint compromise and social engineering that falls outside the core scope of passkey protections.
This discourse also highlights a broader issue: marketing narratives around security products naturally emphasize dramatic breakthroughs to capture attention and investment. Critics argue that some demonstrations, when framed as definitive breakthroughs, can blur the line between vulnerability in process (endpoint compromise, malicious extensions) and vulnerability in the cryptographic or protocol design (the FIDO/WebAuthn model itself). In this sense, the DEFCON stage and the accompanying materials become both a testing ground for ideas and a platform for strategic positioning in a crowded security marketplace.
The broader commentary surrounding Passkeys Pwned also touches on the ethics and practicality of presenting security research in marketing-friendly terms. Some observers suggest that the presentation reads more like a commercial pitch than a rigorous, peer-reviewed security analysis. They caution that conflating endpoint compromises with fundamental passkey weaknesses can mislead organizations into underinvesting in otherwise effective protections while over-investing in speculative or misframed threats.
Within this debate, one recurring theme is whether passkeys can be considered a mature, enterprise-ready solution given their still-nascent interoperation across platforms and ecosystems. The argument for continued optimism emphasizes that passkeys address core weaknesses of passwords—phishing, credential stuffing, password reuse, and breaches that occur due to credential exposure—while acknowledging that no security technology exists in a vacuum. The existence of a plausible attack vector that involves the endpoint does not automatically invalidate the security promises of passkeys in contexts where endpoint integrity is preserved or where end-user environments include robust controls.
In summary, the DEFCON presentation and SquareX’s framing have stirred a comprehensive discussion about the boundary between endpoint security and core authentication technology. The conversation is not merely about whether a single research paper can overturn years of security design work; it is about how organizations should assess threat models, communicate risks to users, and layer protections to cover both robust cryptographic mechanisms and the realities of client-side threats.
Understanding Passkeys: How FIDO/WebAuthn Works
Passkeys sit at the intersection of modern cryptography and user authentication, built on the principles of the FIDO (Fast Identity Online) Alliance and its WebAuthn protocol. A passkey is essentially a public-private cryptographic keypair. The architecture assigns a unique keypair to each website a user enrolls with, binding the keypair cryptographically to that site’s domain. The private key lives on the user’s device—whether that device is a smartphone, a hardware security key, or another compatible authenticator—while the corresponding public key is stored by the site.
During registration, a unique keypair is generated and tied to the specific domain. This binding ensures that, even if a user has multiple accounts across different services, each account has its own cryptographic identity. The private key never leaves the user’s device, and the public key is what the service holds to authenticate future logins. The security model works by leveraging the cryptographic strength of public-key cryptography and a robust binding to the domain that the user is attempting to access.
When the user attempts to log in, the service issues a challenge—a pseudo-random string of data. The user’s device uses the private key that is bound to the site’s domain to sign this challenge, producing a cryptographic signature. The browser then forwards this signature to the service, which uses the stored public key to verify that the signature was created with the corresponding private key. If the verification passes, the user is authenticated and granted access. This process is typically fast, often faster than entering a traditional password, and it eliminates several common attack vectors, especially those associated with password theft and phishing.
The FIDO/WebAuthn framework is designed with several security properties in mind: phishing resistance, as the signature is bound to the legitimate domain; resistance to credential replay; and a strong separation between the private key and server-side storage. Importantly, the private key remains on the user’s device, reducing the likelihood that credentials could be extracted from a central server breach. The public key stored by the service provides a verifiable link to the user’s identity without exposing sensitive material on the server that could be replicated or abused in a data breach.
Despite these advantages, passkeys are not a silver bullet. There are practical hurdles to wide adoption and seamless operation. Interoperability between platforms remains imperfect. A passkey created on one operating system or device may not immediately function across all other platforms without some form of migration or bridging solution. This cross-platform friction means many services still require a fallback to password-based logins or at least a password as a recovery or backup mechanism. In practice, many providers currently require the user to set up a password as a fallback option, either for initial recovery or as an additional factor in certain scenarios. This necessity creates a partial return to password-based behavior, which undermines the one-password-one-authenticator promise that passkeys seek to deliver.
Another practical constraint is the reliance on a trusted device as the primary authenticating factor. If the user’s device is lost, stolen, or compromised, the private key could be at risk, and the service’s ability to verify identity may be impaired until recovery actions are completed. In such cases, recovery processes—often involving backup codes, trusted channels, or alternative verification methods—come into play. The security of passkeys is therefore dependent, in part, on the strength and reliability of the user’s device and the surrounding ecosystem.
A further consideration is the threat model itself. WebAuthn and FIDO acknowledge certain limitations: passkeys are designed to resist phishing and certain types of credential theft, but they assume that the endpoint (the user’s device) can be trusted to some degree. If malware or a malicious extension compromises the device or the browser environment, some protections can be circumvented. The threat model explicitly excludes attacks that rely on tampering with the operating system or browser beyond the scope of the authenticator’s domain binding. In other words, if the device is compromised at the OS level, many of the protections offered by passkeys can be undermined in ways that TLS and end-to-end encryption do not address in isolation. This is a crucial distinction that underlines why security researchers insist that “endpoint hygiene” remains a critical prerequisite for fully realizing the security advantages that passkeys promise.
From a technical perspective, passkeys rely on well-established cryptographic primitives, often leveraging algorithms such as ES256 for signature operations. The keypair generation process establishes a secure cryptographic identity for the user within the context of a specific site or domain. The server stores a reference to the public key, enabling the verification of future login attempts. The user’s device remains the custodian of the private key, maintaining the strongest possible barrier against remote credential theft.
Importantly, WebAuthn’s evolution has refined the user experience and expanded the kinds of authenticators that can participate in the process. A passkey can be stored on a modern smartphone, integrated into a hardware security key, or distributed across a trusted ecosystem of devices. The roaming capability of passkeys—where a user can sign in from different devices without re-registering every time—adds a layer of convenience that bolsters adoption. Still, roaming introduces its own complexities: device-to-device synchronization, secure backup, and ensuring that the same cryptographic material remains bound securely to the appropriate domain across contexts.
From the perspective of user experience, the speed and friction reduction are compelling selling points. Users can expect faster sign-ins and less friction in everyday access to critical services. Security teams tout the resilience to phishing, which is a perennial threat for traditional passwords, as well as protection against credential stuffing and large-scale data breaches where passwords are compromised. These advantages have contributed to broad vendor adoption and a growing ecosystem of services that natively support passkeys.
Nevertheless, the path to full maturity is still unfolding. The interoperability gaps between different platforms and the ongoing development of recovery and fallback strategies must be navigated carefully by organizations planning to deploy passkeys at scale. The absence of a universal, password-free, platform-agnostic login experience across all sites remains a practical constraint for some users and enterprises. In addition, while no widely publicized vulnerabilities known to undermine the FIDO/WebAuthn standard itself have emerged to date, researchers consistently remind the community that no security protocol can remain immune to future, unforeseen attack vectors, particularly those that involve the client environment.
In short, passkeys offer a powerful, phishing-resistant alternative to passwords, with cryptographic guarantees that are strong in the intended threat model. They represent a significant step forward in reducing the risks associated with credential theft, password reuse, and centralized data breaches. Yet, as with any security technology, they are not a universal antidote; their effectiveness hinges on correct implementation, robust endpoint security, reliable cross-platform interoperability, and well-designed recovery mechanisms.
The Role of Interoperation and User Experience
Interoperability challenges, a recurring theme in discussions about passkeys, center on how to ensure seamless use across multiple devices, platforms, and services. For users, the ideal experience is a frictionless sign-in on any device with consistent security properties, without juggling passwords or secondary verification steps that feel intrusive. For organizations, the goal is consistent enforcement of phishing resistance and strong authentication across the enterprise, with centralized policy controls and clear recovery paths.
Industry discussions continue to emphasize the need for standardized flows that work reliably across ecosystems. The promise of passkeys becomes most compelling when cross-platform sign-in is truly seamless. The reality, however, is that platform-specific nuances, differences in authenticator behavior, and the varying support levels from service providers can create gaps that frustrate users. In practice, many services still require a password fallback or offer a recovery mechanism that can be used if passkeys fail for any reason, including device loss or damage. This reality reinforces why passkeys are often framed as a complement to existing security measures rather than a wholesale replacement until broader interoperability is achieved.
The ongoing discussion in security and user-interface circles emphasizes not only cryptographic strength but also practical design. A secure system must offer a straightforward, intuitive user experience while preserving rigorous protections. The balance between usability and security is delicate: too much friction risks user churn, too little friction can compromise security or lead to user misconfigurations. As more services adopt passkeys, the need for cohesive design, clear messaging, and robust fallback strategies becomes increasingly apparent.
In this context, the Passkeys Pwned discourse highlights a broader truth: even strong authentication mechanisms require careful integration with endpoint security, user education, and operational security practices. The technology is only as effective as the ecosystem in which it operates, including the devices users rely on, the browsers they use, the extensions they install, and the policies organizations enforce to protect access to critical resources.
The Security Model and What “End-Point Compromise” Really Means
Understanding passkeys requires a precise view of the security model, including what is and isn’t protected under FIDO/WebAuthn, and what assumptions are baked into the threat models. A central point of contention in the SquareX discussion is whether an endpoint compromise can, in practice, enable theft or misuse of passkeys, and whether such a scenario should be interpreted as a fundamental flaw in passkeys themselves or as a failure to account for endpoint integrity.
The FIDO/WebAuthn framework explicitly delineates what is protected and what remains outside its scope. A primary assertion is that passkeys protect against phishing and unauthorized use by binding keys to legitimate domains and by ensuring that private keys never leave the user’s device. In principle, this design makes it impossible for a remote attacker to simply “steal” a passkey from a server or through a standard network compromise. The keypair remains resident on the authenticator and is never transmitted in a way that could be intercepted by a distant attacker.
The token at the heart of the debate is the device and its environment. If an attacker gains control of the user’s device—through malware, a compromised operating system, or a malicious extension that can alter registration behavior—the security properties of passkeys can be undermined in ways that do not involve exfiltration of the private key. The attacker could, for instance, cause a user to register a new attacker-controlled passkey for a given site, potentially blocking legitimate logins or enabling the attacker’s credential to replace a legitimate one at the point of enrollment. This scenario is distinct from simply extracting a private key from a secure storage medium and raises questions about the threat model’s breadth.
Section 6 of the document that SquareX references discusses “security assumptions” inherent in the passkey trust model. SA-3 posits that applications on the user device can establish secure channels and provide trustworthy server authentication, ensuring message confidentiality and integrity. SA-4 asserts that the computing environment on the FIDO user device and the applications involved in a FIDO operation act as trustworthy agents of the user. These assumptions are designed to reflect a world in which the device and software remain trustworthy enough to support secure cryptographic operations and trustworthy engagements with servers. If these assumptions fail (for example, due to malware or compromised browser components), the strong guarantees offered by passkeys can be undermined.
WebAuthn, the predecessor to FIDO, hints at similar limitations. The framework acknowledges that a malware-infected or compromised browser falls outside the scope of the protections passkeys were designed to provide. The fundamental implication is straightforward: whether an endpoint is compromised is not a failure of the passkey cryptography itself, but a failure of the broader system to maintain a trusted execution environment for the authentication flow. In other words, passkeys assume a secure, trustworthy environment to some degree; if that environment is not secure, passkeys cannot guarantee protection against all forms of attack, just as TLS and end-to-end encryption do not inoculate against endpoint compromise.
This distinction is critical when assessing SquareX’s claims. The company argues that passkeys can be “stolen” via attacker-controlled registration. In response, critics point out that the attacker could be facilitating a situation in which a user unwittingly enrolls an attacker-controlled passkey for a service after being lured by social engineering. However, the defense remains that the user’s previously registered passkeys would not be exposed or stolen simply by the attacker binding a new key through a compromised extension; rather, the login process would present an error or prompt the user to register anew, at which point the attacker could attempt to control the registration. It is a nuanced distinction: the attack is about deception and endpoint compromise affecting registration flows, not about direct theft of an existing private key from the authenticator.
These complexities invite a careful reexamination of the threat landscape. If the endpoint is the belief system underpinning the security guarantees of the passkey, then the entire enterprise security posture is at risk, regardless of passkey strength in ideal conditions. This perspective is not an argument against passkeys; rather, it emphasizes that passkeys must be integrated with robust endpoint protection, secure browser practices, and strict user education. It also underlines the importance of defense-in-depth: no single technology should be expected to solve all authentication challenges, especially in environments where devices can be compromised.
The broader security community often frames this tension as a reminder that end-to-end security and trusted computing bases are only as strong as their weakest link. Passkeys dramatically reduce certain attack surfaces—most notably phishing and credential theft—but they cannot completely immunize an environment that fails to protect the client device. The nuance is that the threat model must explicitly acknowledge endpoint risks and must implement layered controls to mitigate them.
The Endpoint Threat Model and Its Implications
A key takeaway from the discussion around Passkeys Pwned is that the endpoint remains a critical locus of risk. When a user’s device is compromised, even a technology with strong cryptographic foundations can be coerced into suboptimal outcomes. The attacker could, for example, inject malicious code or extensions that affect the registration flow, hijack the process of creating a new passkey, or influence which keys are bound to which domains. These actions do not grant the attacker access to the user’s already-established passkeys, but they can disrupt legitimate access and potentially assign control of a passkey to the attacker under certain conditions.
From this vantage point, defending against passkey vulnerabilities requires an ecosystem approach. This includes securing browsers, monitoring and preventing extensions that could manipulate sign-in flows, deploying endpoint protection that detects malicious software, and educating users about social engineering risks. It also involves designing recovery and fallback mechanisms that minimize risk when a device is compromised, balancing convenience and security in ways that do not introduce new vulnerabilities.
The ongoing debate also touches on how security researchers present findings. Some observers argue that framing endpoint compromises as a fundamental flaw in a universal authentication standard risks undermining trust in a technology that, in its intended threat model, is resilient and effective. Others argue that realism about client-side risks is necessary for meaningful risk assessment and for fostering a security culture that recognizes that no single solution eliminates all risk. The tension reflects a broader shift in cybersecurity toward more holistic protection models that combine cryptographic strength with robust device and user protections.
In practice, the community’s consensus remains that passkeys substantially improve security against the most damaging forms of credential abuse while acknowledging that endpoint integrity is essential to realizing those benefits. The field continues to refine how best to articulate threat models, develop practical mitigations for endpoint risks, and craft policies that align with the real-world behaviors and devices of users and organizations.
Context: Past Claims, Skepticism, and the Road Ahead
The discussion around Passkeys Pwned did not occur in a vacuum. Earlier, another security company publicly claimed to have bypassed FIDO-based two-factor authentication with an attack that was later withdrawn. In that case, the sites under attack offered FIDO as one option among several 2FA methods and allowed fallback to weaker, less secure forms. The attack did not directly undermine FIDO’s intended security model, which emphasizes robust phishing resistance and credential protection. The subsequent withdrawal underscored the importance of not conflating weaknesses in fallback mechanisms with intrinsic weaknesses in FIDO-based authentication.
This history reinforces a cautious approach to security claims that hinge on highly publicized demonstrations. It is a reminder that the ecosystem must distinguish between vulnerabilities in supplemental components (e.g., user interface vulnerabilities, browser extensions, fallback mechanisms) and fundamental security properties of the core protocol. While isolated incidents should be taken seriously and investigated with rigor, they should not automatically translate into a wholesale revision of a security paradigm that has demonstrated substantial resilience against a broad range of attacks.
The critique surrounding Passkeys Pwned also highlights the role of context in evaluating security claims. Passkeys, as implemented through FIDO and WebAuthn, provide a framework that significantly raises the bar for credential theft and phishing. They do not offer a panacea; they are part of a broader, layered security strategy. As researchers like Dan Goodin and others have noted, the value of passkeys increases when used in conjunction with strong endpoint security, structured device management, and user education about social engineering and extension risk.
From a policy and enterprise perspective, the conversation emphasizes adoptability. Organizations must weigh the security benefits of passkeys against the practical realities of their environments: device diversity, cross-platform compatibility, user behavior, and the strength of recovery pathways. The market has increasingly recognized passkeys as an important component of modern authentication strategies, and the dialogue around limitations and risks should be understood as part of the maturation process rather than a signal to abandon passkeys altogether.
In practice, the consensus among many security professionals is that passkeys remain the best defense against the persistent problems of deep credential compromise, phishing, and mass data breaches. The emergence of well-documented endpoint risks should spur continued investment in secure device ecosystems, user education, and robust risk management practices, rather than a wholesale dismissal of passkeys as a flawed approach. The ultimate trajectory is toward more mature interoperable cross-platform support, stronger recovery mechanisms, and integrated defenses that cover both the cryptographic strength of the passkey and the security of the user’s device and software environment.
Expert Opinions and Industry Response
Experts in the field have weighed in with measured skepticism and careful nuance. Some security engineers advocate for a cautious interpretation of the findings, asserting that the validity of the passkey’s cryptographic guarantees remains intact when endpoint compromise is not assumed, and that any vulnerability discovered in registration flow should be addressed through improved threat modeling, better user prompts, and stronger controls around extension behaviors. Others highlight the importance of understanding that social engineering and extension-based attacks illustrate real-world risks that must be mitigated in production environments; insights from such research can inform best practices for deployment, user education, and governance.
In interviews and commentary, security professionals have stressed the need for precise language when describing vulnerabilities. The distinction between “passkeys can be stolen” and “attacks can manipulate passkey registration or extension behavior” is not merely semantic. It determines how organizations implement defenses, how they communicate risks to users, and how they allocate resources for endpoint protection, user training, and policy enforcement. The aim is to ensure that security claims remain accurate, actionable, and grounded in the scope of the threat model the authentication system is designed to withstand.
Of course, skepticism and debate are natural in a field where new technologies rapidly reshape risk landscapes. The central takeaway for practitioners is not to abandon passkeys but to recognize that endpoint risk remains a critical axis of defense. This means combining passkeys with robust endpoint security, diverse authentication factors where needed, and a comprehensive security program that anticipates social engineering, browser extension abuse, and other client-side threats. As the ecosystem matures, stakeholders can expect more sophisticated threat models, improved user workflows, and stronger alignment between marketing narratives and technical realities.
Practical Implications and Recommendations
For organizations evaluating passkeys, the SquareX debate emphasizes the importance of a holistic approach to authentication—one that accounts for the entire chain from device security to user behavior. Here are practical implications and recommendations that emerge from this discussion:
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Embrace passkeys as a core component of a multi-layered authentication strategy. Passkeys dramatically reduce the risk of phishing and password-based credential theft, but they should be deployed within a broader security architecture that includes endpoint protection, secure browser configurations, and strong device management.
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Maintain robust endpoint security. The security of passkeys is tightly linked to the integrity of the device and browser. Organizations should invest in endpoint protection, anti-malware solutions, strict extension policies, and ongoing monitoring for anomalous extension activity or browser tampering.
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Implement enterprise-grade recovery and fallback plans. While passkeys reduce reliance on passwords, fallback mechanisms are still necessary for account recovery and accessibility. Clear policies for device loss, passkey backup, and secure recovery processes help minimize risk during unforeseen events.
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Educate users about social engineering and extension risks. User education remains a critical defense. Training should cover the dangers of social engineering, the risks of installing unfamiliar extensions, and best practices for verifying the legitimacy of prompts and requests.
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Ensure cross-platform interoperability planning. As passkeys spread across devices and ecosystems, organizations should pilot and test cross-platform sign-in workflows, identify gaps, and implement migration or bridging strategies to minimize friction for end users.
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Audit and governance. Establish governance around authenticator usage, monitor for abnormal registration patterns, and enforce policies that limit the scope of extensions or other software that could impact authentication workflows.
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Stay informed about evolving threat models. The security landscape is dynamic, and endpoint threats continue to evolve. Regular reviews of threat models, security controls, and incident response plans are essential to a resilient authentication program.
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Balance security with user experience. Design and implement passkey workflows that are intuitive and fast while preserving safety. The best security programs remove friction without sacrificing protection, and they adapt to user behaviors and expectations.
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Leverage hardware-backed authenticators where appropriate. Hardware security keys and trusted devices can provide robust protection against certain classes of attacks and may enhance resistance to endpoint threats when used as part of a broader strategy.
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Transparently communicate risk. For consumers and enterprise stakeholders alike, it’s important to clearly communicate what passkeys protect, what scenarios pose risk, and what additional safeguards are in place. Honest risk communication builds trust and supports informed decision-making.
A Roadmap for Adoption
Organizations planning to adopt passkeys at scale should consider a phased, risk-aware approach. Start with pilot deployments in controlled environments to validate interoperability and user experience across devices. Collect quantitative data on sign-in speed, failure rates, and user satisfaction, and pair this with qualitative feedback about perceived security. Use this data to refine recovery pathways and security policies before broader rollout. Establish clear incident response playbooks for endpoint compromise scenarios that consider passkey-specific dynamics, such as regaining control after device loss or preventing attacker-controlled enrollments.
The industry should continue investing in research to further tighten the threat model around endpoint risks and to develop practical mitigations. This includes improved browser protections, more resilient extension policies, and enhanced telemetry that can detect abnormal registration activity. As adoption grows, the security community must work toward standardized best practices that help organizations implement passkeys in a secure, scalable, and user-friendly way.
The Passkeys Debate in Context: What This Means for Users and Developers
For end users, the core message remains reassuring: passkeys offer a powerful, phishing-resistant form of authentication that reduces the risk of credential theft and large-scale breaches. The potential endpoint vulnerabilities highlighted by SquareX do not imply that passkeys are inherently broken; rather, they underscore the reality that security is a system property. The integrity of passkeys depends on the strength of the device, the security of the browser environment, and the absence of social-engineering-influenced registration injections.
Developers and service providers should take a similarly balanced view. Investing in passkey-ready authentication requires attention to both protocol-level security and client-side integrity. The future of authentication is not simply about switching to passkeys; it is about building robust, end-to-end security ecosystems that integrate cryptographic protections with resilient device management and user-centered design.
The broader industry takeaway is about continuous improvement and the value of cautious scrutiny. Security research that questions assumptions—provided it is precise about threat models and limitations—helps advance the field by encouraging better defenses, clearer communications, and more rigorous testing. The dialogue surrounding Passkeys Pwned should be seen in this light: as part of a broader push to raise standards, not an indictment of passkeys as a concept.
In conclusion, passkeys represent a significant step forward in protecting users from the most damaging forms of credential abuse. The concerns raised about endpoint risks deserve serious consideration and action, but they should be integrated into a nuanced, layered security strategy rather than interpreted as a wholesale condemnation of passkeys. The trajectory remains positive: with continued research, improved interoperability, robust endpoint defenses, and thoughtful deployment strategies, passkeys can form a central pillar of secure, user-friendly authentication for the foreseeable future.
Conclusion
Passkeys, underpinned by the FIDO/WebAuthn standard, deliver a compelling defense against phishing and traditional credential theft by leveraging cryptographic keypairs bound to specific domains. The recent Passkeys Pwned discourse, as presented by SquareX, emphasizes the importance of recognizing endpoint risks and the limitations of any security model when faced with device compromise and social engineering in real-world settings. The core security properties of passkeys remain robust, especially when endpoint integrity is preserved and recovery mechanisms are well designed.
The debate underscores an essential truth for the digital age: no single technology alone can guarantee absolute security. Passkeys, even in their strongest form, must be part of a broader security framework that includes device protection, user education, strict policy enforcement, and careful handling of fallback mechanisms. The takeaway for organizations is to adopt passkeys thoughtfully, align deployment with mature threat modeling, and continuously refine defenses in response to evolving risks. As the ecosystem matures, cross-platform interoperability, more resilient recovery options, and clearer guidance on endpoint risk management will further strengthen the role of passkeys in secure, scalable authentication across a diverse range of services and devices.
